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PROMISES AND PERILS OF NEW GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE: A CASE OF THE G20
Sungjoon Cho and Claire R. Kelly*
ABSTRACT
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, a new global governance
structure emerged. During and subsequent to the crisis, the G20 arose as a
coordinating executive among international governance institutions. It set
policy agendas, prioritized initiatives and, working through the Financial
Stability Board, drew other governance institutions and networks such as
the International Monetary Fund, the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development,
the World Trade Organization, the International Association of Insurance
Supervisors and the International Organization of Securities Commissions
to set standards, monitor enforcement and compliance, and aid recovery.
Its authority cross-cuts regimes and creates collaborative linkages between
economic law and social issues such as food security and the environment.
Its leadership role, born out of exigency, now continues to evolve as part of
the new international economic law order.
The G20’s coordination of institutions and networks exemplifies a new
form of global governance. Network coordination offers an opportunity to
confront complex problems with a needed comprehensive approach. The
institutions and networks engage in an ongoing dialectical process that
propels standard setters towards convergence on a number of fronts. The
actors in this process employ a variety of tools to forge consensus and the
*
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G20 leverages this consensus-creating process to achieve its goals.
Unpacking these tools can help us tackle intricate questions that arise from
this new structure. In particular, we focus on concerns of effectiveness and
legitimacy originating from the G20’s coordination of multiple networks
and institutions.
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I. An Emerging Governance Model: Trans-Governmental Regulatory
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II. A Theory of Network Coordination: Pre-Existing Networks,
Regulatory Products, and Operative Frameworks ...........................................15
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3. The Insurance Network .....................................................................52
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IV. Evaluating the G20’s Coordination ..................................................................56
A. The Effectiveness of G20 Operation...........................................................57
B. Legitimacy Questions: Accountability, Equity, and Representation
of the G20 Operation ................................................................................63
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INTRODUCTION
An unprecedented challenge calls for an unprecedented response.
The exigency of the financial crisis in 2008, which precipitated the worst
global recession since the Great Depression in the 1920s, forced major
global economies to develop a new type of collective regulatory response,
which was largely unfathomable under traditional international cooperation
mechanisms, such as diplomacy or treaty-making. The leaders of twenty
major economies – the G20 Leaders– promptly assumed the unprecedented
role of an executive coordinator over pre-existing trans-governmental
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regulatory networks (TRNs).1 In doing so, the G20 harnessed these sectorspecific TRNs2 comprised of professional regulatory agencies from
different economies and set itself at the helm as an executive coordinator. It
promised the spontaneity and efficacy necessary to respond to the financial
crisis. This article aims to scrutinize this phenomenon of coordinated
networks that remains largely unaddressed.
One of the greatest challenges globalization has brought to
international law is that it has irreversibly altered the traditional notion of
time and space in which we used to grapple with international law.3 The
end of the Cold War and the spectacular advancement of technologies have
molded a multi-faceted phenomenon of globalization: integration,
interdependence, spontaneity, and synchrony. In an unprecedented pace,
more goods, more services, more people and more money circulate all over
the world.4 Nevertheless, the global financial crisis in 2008 has left a
sobering lesson that globalization remains a mixed blessing. A globalized
financial and trade system has forced national economies to share not only
prosperity but also risks. This dark side of globalization tends to cast
daunting challenges to regulators – both domestic and international.5 First,
effects of domestic regulations may become limited as domestic systems
become highly sensitive to external forces. Second, as is seen in the climate
change debate, certain regulatory problems are inter-national per se.
1

Cf. Andrew F. Cooper, The G20 as an Improvised Crisis Committee and/or a
Contested ‘Steering Committee’ for the World, 86 INT’L AFF. 741 (2010) (characterizing
the G20 as a “steering committee” or a “crisis committee” to deliver specific regulatory
deliverables).
2
See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) (presenting
one of the most comprehensive narratives on nascent government networks and their normgenerating effects); David Zaring, Rulemaking and Adjudication in International Law, 46
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 563, 576 (2008) [hereinafter Zaring, Rulemaking and
Adjudication] (arguing that “networks are the rulemakers of international administrative
law.”).
3
See e.g., John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity
in International Relations, 47 INT. ORG. 139, 172 (1993) (observing the emergence of a
“decentered yet integrated space-of-flows, operating in real time, which exists alongside
the spaces-of-places that we call national economies”).
4
Philip H. Gordon, Europe's Cautious Globalization, in 88 CONTEMP. STUD. IN ECON.
& FIN. ANALYSIS 3 (Janet Laible et al. eds., 2006) (“[C]learly the degree, intensity, speed,
volume, and geographic reach of economic globalization today far exceed anything that has
come before.”); Dinah Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World, 25 B.C.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 273, 276 (2002). (“[I]nformation and communications technology
has emerged as a dominant force in the global system of production, while trade in goods,
services, and financial instruments are more prevalent than any time in history.”).
5
Slaughter characterizes the dilemma of needing more government yet fearing it as a
“globalization paradox.” SLAUGHTER, supra note 2, at 8.
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Domestic regulatory efforts alone are insufficient to address such problems.
Third, international regulations, if any, may not come as quickly as the
urgency would demand.
At the inception and throughout the 2008 financial crisis, society
saw national governments struggle to muster stimulus packages, fight off
protectionism, and save at-risk entities. Notably, society also saw an
international effort to facilitate these national efforts. The G20 Leaders
initiated this international effort and managed to save 21 million jobs in
2009 and 2010.6 Ironically, however, this unprecedented success of global
policy coordination led the public to perceive the G20 from a rather
superficial, that is to say mainly “political,” standpoint. In other words, the
public remains largely uninformed of the behind-the-scene intense
regulatory interactions among professional regulatory agencies at a microoperational level. The bottom line is that G20 and the resources that it
brought to bear did not spring out of nothing; they were in fact an outcome
of decades-long policy networks between/among like-minded government
officials communicating inside and outside of relevant international
organizations.
Without the unique density and frequency of their
interactions in those critical issue areas (such as international finance and
securities), the G20 could not have proved so successful: it would have
probably been yet another pompous initiative delivering no practical
impacts. At the same time, the G20’s coordination of these TRNs to
confront the crisis clearly revealed a whole far greater than the sum of its
parts.
Admittedly, its success needs to be examined rigorously. Empirical
confirmations are still limited and any attempt to quantify these successes
may suffer a selection bias.
Nonetheless, the coordinated TRN
phenomenon is not a mere anecdote: it is a new trend which challenges our
conventional understanding of global governance. We must probe closely
the new TRN phenomenon, and in particular the coordination of networks,
to verify if it brings truly beneficial changes and if so at what costs. And
the mere fact that a TRN is successful in creating standards does not
necessarily mean that it was as successful as it could have been. By
definition, focusing on standards that were developed will not address those
instances where the TRN sought to, or should have sought to, develop
standards but failed.
In this regard, we propose to examine the work of the web of TRNs
involved in the G20’s efforts to steer through the financial crisis by
dissecting: (i) the G20’s coordination through the use of regulatory
6

G20 Saves 21 Mln Jobs with Crisis Measures—UN, REUTERS, Apr. 19, 2010,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/19/financial-jobs-idUSLDE63I24Q20100419.
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blueprints or frameworks; (ii) the TRNs means by which they arrive at
points of decisions (their dynamics); and (iii) the decisions they reach (end
products). Much has already been written about TRNs,7 but one piece that
has been missing is how the TRNs actually do their work, in particular
under a political coordinative mechanism, such as the G20.
Additionally, we propose to identify taxonomy of various moves
(tools) made within TRNs that we call the “intra-network dynamics.” We
make no judgment about the value of any particular tool, although readers
may quickly realize that some tools are more palatable than others when
one thinks about TRNs as a form of global governance. While these social
tools have already been extant in each network, it was the rise of the G20
which awakened their genuine regulatory potential in an unprecedented
endeavor to deliver desperate regulatory effects to avert the financial crisis.
We also consider the end products of these TRNs and identify their
characteristics as well as their utility. Again, we do not make any value
judgment about any particular end product. Instead, we hope that by
revealing and deconstructing the G20’s coordination, the intra-network
dynamics, and end products we can offer an analytical lens through which
we better understand this emerging paradigm of global governance. In our
view, this lens will reveal complex questions concerning efficacy and
legitimacy.
Our thesis on the G20 as a new paradigm of global governance
unfolds in the following sequence. Part I attempts to render a working
definition of a TRN. After providing an intellectual pedigree and
theoretical underpinnings behind the government network theory, the Part
highlights the TRN’s various characteristics, such as the expert, informal,
and incremental nature of participants’ dialogue and eventual normgenerating operations. Part II offers a theory of network coordination by
explaining the use of frameworks or blueprints that take advantage of preexisting network dynamics resulting in specific end products or regulatory
prototypes. Part III applies the theoretical construction of coordinated
TRNs to the case of the G20. This case study offers both empirical
confirmations for and mismatches with the TRN model. Part IV evaluates
the coordinated TRN model in accordance with two major criteria: efficacy
and legitimacy.
Finally, a caveat of this article is in order. Due to its inevitable
political nature as a global executive coordinator, the G20 tends to draw

7

Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34
YALE J. INT’L L. 113, 114 (2009) (“In recent years, scholars of global governance have
devoted substantial attention to the promise and perils of. . .regulatory networks (TRNs).”).
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various critics on its performance.8 In particular it has been faulted for
being an “ineffective talk shop.”9 Some question whether the G20 Leaders
Summit will have any influence once the crisis subsides.10 These may be
aggravated by heightened expectations given its initial successes.11 Yet our
main focus in this article is more of uncelebrated, workmanlike aspects of
the G20 operation. We aim to demonstrate, without any ideological bias,
the G20’s internal, microscopic operational dynamics, as well as certain
conditions under which such operations tend to work best.
I. AN EMERGING GOVERNANCE MODEL: TRANS-GOVERNMENTAL
REGULATORY NETWORKS (TRNS)
The recent prominence of the G20 has demonstrated a new
possibility in tackling those challenges brought by globalization. TRNs
offer a flexible and pragmatic alternative to the treaty process. The TRN
process is dialogical, norm-generating, and incremental.
TRNs represent a relatively recent, but increasingly prevalent, center
of international law making. Traditionally international rules were
negotiated and concluded by a formal treaty-making process. However,
barring some exceptions, such as the EU, most international law-making
8

See, e.g., Peter Apps, Eurasia Chief Sees Leaderless "G-zero" World, REUTERS, Jan.
5,
2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/05/us-eurasia-interviewidUSTRE70422220110105.
9
Christopher Malcolm, And Then There was One—An Overview of the Fifth Summit of
the Americas, 16 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 11, 16 (2010) (“[T]here were still many others,
however, that were skeptical and had expected that it would be no more than a talk shop”);
It Cuts Both Ways, Uncles Sam, THE ECONOMIC TIMES, Oct. 20, 2010,
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-10-19/news/27626561_1_globalimbalances-global-reserve-currency-numero-uno (“G20, a group that is mostly seen as a
toothless body, a talk shop. .
10
TOWARD THE CONSOLIDATION OF G20 SUMMITS: FROM CRISIS COMMITTEE TO
GLOBAL STEERING COMMITTEE 2 (Colin I. Bradford & Wonhyuk Lim, eds., The Brookings
Institute Press 2011) (“There is great concern, expressed by Il SaKong. . .the G20 may fade
away as a significant forum for global leadership as the global financial crisis subsides and
the current focus on financial and macro- economic issues increasingly shifts to technical
matters unsuitable for discussion at the leadership level. . . .”).
11
See, e.g., Gabriele Steinhauser & Greg Keller, Fuzzy Compromise Threatens
Relevance
of
G-20,
ASSOC.
PRESS,
Feb.
19,
2011,
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=12942693. High expectations on the role of
G20 seem to have already formed among global trade investors. In the most recent
incidence of global market volatility, they immediately turned to G20 for a prompt
collective response. See Se Young Lee, G20 Ministers Hold Call, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7,
2011; G20 Deputies to Hold Crisis Call on Saturday: Brazil, REUTERS, Aug. 6, 2011.
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now occurs in a highly de-centralized structure, which militates against a
domestic analogy. Even with the existence of a well-operating international
regulatory organization, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), any
formal legislative outcome tends to be limited, often “minimal,” for several
reasons.12
First of all, a treaty-making process requires an enormous amount of
diplomatic, and political, efforts necessary to reach both consensus and
compromise among parties concerned. Lobbies from interested and
affected constituencies are legion.13 Naturally, it is not only a painstaking
but also treacherous process. So often, the process loses its initial passion
or momentum as it develops.14 Moreover, a treaty’s legally “binding”
nature tends to make negotiating parties reluctant in nailing down any
definite texts, leaving them enough flexibility for future contingencies.15
Likewise, treaties are often accompanied by reservations, understandings
12

See, e.g., John H. Jackson, International Economic Law in Times That Are
Interesting, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 8 (2000) [hereinafter International Economic Law]
(viewing that “treaties are often an awkward albeit necessary method of designing
institutions needed in today’s interdependent world, but they do not solve many
problems”). Cf. Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International Agreements Informal, 45
INT’L ORG. 495, 537–38 (1991) (summarizing the benefits of informal agreements vis-à-vis
formal agreements (treaties)).
13
See, e.g., John Cushman Jr., Intense Lobbying Against Global Warming Treaty, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 7, 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/07/us/intense-lobbying-againstglobal-warming-treaty.html; Anup Shah, COP3—Kyoto Protocol Climate Conference,
GLOBAL ISSUES, Feb. 15, 2002, http://www.globalissues.org/article/183/cop3-kyotoprotocol-climate-conference; Urging the Oil and Auto Industries to Support the Kyoto
Protocol, GREENPEACE, Apr. 5, 2001, http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/en/news-andblogs/news/urging-the-oil-and-auto-indust/; Andrew C. Revkin, Industry Ignored Its
Scientists
on
Climate,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Apr.
23,
2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/24/science/earth/24deny.html.
14
See, e.g., President William J. Clinton, Remarks by the President at the Opening of
the Commemoration of 50 Years After Nuremberg: Human Rights and the Rule of Law,
Oct. 17, 1995, available in 1998 WL 608247 (“Internationally, as we meet here, talks are
underway at the United Nations to establish a permanent international criminal court.
Rwanda and the difficulties we have had with this special tribunal underscores the need for
such a court. And the United States will work to see that it is created.”); THE AM. NONGOVERNMENTAL ORG. COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT., CHRONOLOGY OF US ACTIONS
RELATED
TO
THE
INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL
COURT,
www.amicc.org/docs/US%20Chronology.pdf (2011) (“US votes against the adoption of the
treaty out of concern that the ICC accuse US nationals of crimes for political reasons.”);
Henry T. King & Theodore C. Theofrastous, From Nuremberg to Rome: A Step Backward
for U.S. Foreign Policy, 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 47, 52 (1999) (the U.S. “identified
ideological and political differences with the Statute”).
15
Sungjoon Cho, The WTO’s Gemeinschaft, 56 ALA. L. REV. 483, 526 (2004). But see
Oona A. Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1821 (2003) (explaining
reasons why states may wish to sign onto treaties).
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and declarations that practically qualify their initial legal effects.16 Finally,
as a treaty-making process is tortuous, so is its “amending” process.
Therefore, a regulatory treaty, once fixed, is hard to keep abreast of the
subsequently altering regulatory environment.
These shortcomings of treaties often lead to limited, or failed,
international cooperation. This in turn causes countries to adhere to their
own domestic regulations in a unilateral fashion. This regulatory failure
tends to be more revealing and thus more problematic in the face of
contemporary economic interdependence, in particular in times of crisis.
Global business betrays its frustration in the face of this lack of regulatory
coordination that is continuously fragmenting the global marketplace
against the wave of globalization.17
As a response to these challenges, new attempts have emerged to
overcome the problems of the conventional treaty-making process.
Throughout the world regulators experiencing the same regulatory
problems, convene frequently, meeting and talking with each other in order
to enlighten and be enlightened. They establish various kinds of
relationships, from formal to informal. Occasionally, international
organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the WTO or the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) even
provide like-minded regulators with a number of fora to interact. Over time,
relationships become solidified and tend to evolve into systematized
networks.18 These TRNs invariably produce certain regulatory norms. The
recent experience of the G20 in response to a global financial crisis offers a
propitious pathway toward such a new paradigm of global lawmaking and
global governance.19
16

University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, U.S. Reservations, Declarations,
and
Understandings
to
Human
Rights
Treaties,
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/usres.html (last visited June 7, 2011).
17
See Sungjoon Cho, Defragmenting World Trade, 27 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 39, 71
(2006).
18
See notably Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6
EUR. J. INT’L L. 503, 535 (1995) [hereinafter Slaughter, International Law]; Anne-Marie
Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 183, 184 (1997); Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks, in THE ROLE OF
LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 178 (Michael Byers ed., 2000) [hereinafter Slaughter, Government
Networks].
19
In fact, the origin of transgovernmental networks dates back to the early seventies
with the proliferation of UN agencies such as the “United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF),” and the “United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO).” See generally United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), About UNICEF,
http://www.unicef.org/uwwide/ (last visited on Oct. 30, 2010). See generally United
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Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), What is UNESCO,
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco/about-us/ (last visited Jul. 13, 2011). “These
professional agencies flourished under the auspices of the UN as many government
officials or agencies convened, exchanged views, and undertook joint actions in their
sector-specific fora. As the Nineties dawned and with the end of the Cold War, both
exogenous and endogenous factors contributed to the transgovernmental regulatory drive.”
Sungjoon Cho, Rethinking APEC: A New Experiment for a Post-Modern Institutional
Arrangement, in WTO AND EAST ASIA: NEW PERSPECTIVES 401 (Mitsuo Matsushita &
Dukgeun Ahn eds., 2004). In this context, it can be said that few purely “domestic” issues
remain in an era of globalization and interdependence. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), GLOBALIZATION: WHAT CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES
FOR
GOVERNMENTS
(2006),
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=OCDE/GD(96)6
4&docLanguage=En [hereinafter OECD, Globalization]. Likewise, in the United States,
non-foreign affairs agencies, such as the Department of Justice and the Department of
Treasury accounted for a dramatic increase (from 1,578 to 2,265: 44%) in the levels of US
direct hires overseas over the last decade, which mainly reflects the increasing
“globalization” of US national interests. THE US GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE
(GAO), OVERSEAS PRESENCE: STAFFING AT US DIPLOMATIC POSTS (REPORT TO THE
CHAIRMAN, LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES) 18–21 (1994),
http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat2/153262.pdf. Keohane and Nye depicted this phenomenon as
“societal interdependence” which eventuates “policy interdependence.” Robert O. Keohane
& Joseph S. Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations, 27
WORLD POL. 39, 61 (1974) [hereinafter Keohane & Nye, Transgovernmental Relations]. In
the same vein, Hopkins also observed that “increased interdependence” elicited many
important questions, e.g., “how should the world’s food, energy and natural resources be
shared among the world’s peoples?” Raymond F. Hopkins, Global Management Networks:
The Internationalization of Domestic Bureaucracies, 30 INT. SOC. SCI. J. 31, 31 (1978).
Future international transactions including imports and exports would be hampered by
potential regulatory gaps between domestic and international arenas. As a prescription for
“global market failure,” Professor Jackson has emphasized the necessity of “human
institutions” which helps markets to function successfully. International Economic Law,
supra note 12, at 5. TRNs discussed in this paper, can be said to fall within the rubric of
such human institutions at large. In addition, technological innovation such as the
"Internet" has since contributed significantly to the ability to respond to the various
transgovernmental regulatory needs brought about by globalization. Kal Raustiala, The
Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of
International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 12 (2002) (observing that “the rise of. . .the Internet
has progressively made long-distance communication, and thus networks, far easier. . . .”).
As Gerard Ruggie aptly observes, this networking phenomenon can be understood as “a
decentralized yet integrated space-of-flows, operating in real time, which exists alongside
the spaces-of-places that we call national economies.” John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality
and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations, 47 INT’L ORG. 139, 172
(1993). Endogenously, government officials have become more professional and expert in
the face of the aforementioned complicated and turbulent regulatory challenges. Cf. Jane
Perlez, As Diplomacy Loses Luster, Young Stars Flee State Dept., N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 5,
2000, http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/global/090500us-statedept.html (quoting
Mark L. von Hagen, Director of the Harriman Institute at Columbia University stating that
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TRNs have several key characteristics.
First, TRNs are
“transgovernmental,” rather than “international.” Existing national agencies
are trans-linked to each other. They do not assume an international space
of their own.20 As trans-national, TRNs mainly consists of players from
the public sector, the working-level government officials.
NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs) may play an important role in the
operation of TRNs they are not the primary actors. 21 For example, the main
“smart graduates who want to join government are heading for the Departments of the
Treasury or Commerce.”). This position mirrors that of Keohane and Nye. They limited the
term “transnational” to nongovernmental actors, and the term “transgovernmental” to
define sub-units of governments on those occasions when they act relatively autonomously
from high politics. Keohane & Nye, Transgovernmental Relations, supra note 19, at 41.
20
Cho, supra note 19, at 401.
21
For instance, Professor Freeman conceptualizes “public governance” in a novel way
as a “set of negotiated relationships between the public and the private.” Jody Freeman,
The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 548 (2000). According to
this view, the regulatory decision-making process tends to be decentralized since “public
and private actors negotiate over policy-making, implementation and enforcement.” Id. As
a result, more cooperative or “aggregate” notion of accountability is offered as an
alternative to “formal and hierarchical” accountability that dominates conventional
administrative law. Id. In some cases, a (private) transnational network plays a cooperative
and complementary, but sometimes competitive, role vis-à-vis a (public) government
network. For instance, a private network under the aegis of the FIBV (International
Federation of Stock Exchanges)—a trade organization for regulated securities and
derivative markets world-wide—is regarded as a counterpart to a public network under the
auspice of the IOSCO (International Organization of Securities Commissions) which
represents the world’s governmental agencies involved with the supervision of financial
markets. The FIBV name has changed to the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE),
About WFE, http://www.world-exchanges.org/about-wfe (last visited on Oct. 30, 2010);
see also World Federation of Exchanges (WFE), Our Mission, http://www.worldexchanges.org/about-wfe/our-mission (last visited on Jul. 13, 2011). See also IOSCO
Historical Background, http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=background (last
visited on Oct. 30, 2010). One of its basic role is “to act as the central reference point for
the industry by offering members guidance in the process of international harmonization of
business practices,” which is quite complementary to the IOSCO’s regulatory role
considering that the it is composed of “regulates.” See id. However, some of the FIBV’s
(WFE’s) goals—i.e., “to maintain a platform for securities markets professionals to discuss
issues of common interest”—may overlap with those of the IOSCO, in which sense the
relationship between these two networks can be depicted as “competitive.” See id.
Meanwhile, it is worthy of highlighting that the two networks interact (network) with each
other, for instance, by participating in the other’s meetings. WFE, WFE Becomes Affiliate
Member of IOSCO, http://www.world-exchanges.org/news-views/news/wfe-becomesaffiliate-member-iosco, (last visited Oct. 30, 2010). Another example of such interaction
(networking) between a transnational (private) network and a transgovernmental (public)
regulatory network can be found in the relationship between the IFCI (International
Finance and Commodities Institute), and the Bank for International Settlement (BIS) and
the IOSCO. The IFCI, a non-profit organization nesting a network among the world’s
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banking network, the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (BCBS) is
comprised of the central bank governors from 27 countries.22
Second, a TRN is “regulatory” in nature, which means deals with
particular regulatory issues or problems.23 Thus, TRNs differ from “transjudicial networks”, which involve judges from different jurisdictions
exchanging views.24 For example, the major insurance network, the
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), sets standards
meant to guide national insurance regulators in their regulation of insurers.
25

Third, it is a “network.” The network concept can cover a range of
gatherings, but the most important feature of a network is that it is a
“process” rather than an “entity.”26 The process allows a TRN to be
positioned in a symbiotic relationship with conventional international
organizations. In other words, networking as a process can take place in an
international organization qua entity. The process capitalizes on a
“common ’belief’ or ’faith’ . . . to better regulatory outcomes” amongst
networkers.27 This common belief is most likely to stem from common
“experience” and “knowledge” shared by participants of the network, i.e.,
professional
working-level
government
officials28
International
major derivatives exchange and financial firms, web-posts a quarterly updated library of
about 100 official documents contributed by major international regulatory organizations
such as the BIS and the IOSCO. IOSCO Library of Public Documents,
http://www.iosco.org/library/index.cfm?whereami=pubdocs (last visited Jul. 14, 2011).
Despite these rich interaction between transnational (private) networks and
transgovernmental (public) regulatory networks, such transnational (private) networks
should be understood as complementary to the transgovernmental (public) network in
terms of regulatory function. Although the “new medievalists” proclaim the end of the
nation-state thanks to the “information technology revolution”, private power is still no
substitute for state power, and a gain in power by non-state actors does not necessarily
translate into a loss of power for the state. SLAUGHTER, supra note 18, at 184. Likewise,
Sol Picciotto also acknowledges the validity of states itself, though he observed a new
trend of disintegration within them. Sol Picciotto, Networks in International Economic
Integration: Fragmented States and the Dilemmas of Neo-Liberalism, 17 NW. J. INT'L L. &
BUS. 1014, 1014–22 (1996–97).
22
Banking for International Settlements, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision:
About the Basel Committee, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2011).
23
Cho, supra note 19, at 402.
24
See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication,
29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99 (1994) (exploring the commonalities among, and consequences of,
several instances of transjudicial communication). Cho, supra note 19, at 402 .
25
International Association of Insurance Supervisors, http://www.iaisweb.org/ (last
visited Feb. 24, 2011).
26
Cho, supra note 19, at 381.
27
Id.
28
In the context of Western social and philosophical traditions, one may attribute a
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organizations often provide government networkers with physical forums
while some TRNs may even mirror the operational format of international
organizations.29 Therefore, any physical body or even a more fluid
relationship may fall under this category once it meets certain requirements
characterizing it as a network.30 For example, the Banking Network, which
includes the BCBS, can operate within the IMF.
Already in the early seventies, Keohane & Nye observed this
phenomenon among like-minded government officials and labeled it as
“transgovernmental coalition building.”31 They highlighted a “sense of
collegiality” developed and reinforced by their membership in common
profession, which may be analogous to the “epistemic community” as Peter
Haas famously dubbed it.32. Likewise, Eugene A. Ludwig, the former
Comptroller of the Currency submitted that “I am convinced that all
regulators today share a common concern that spans geographical
boundaries and transcends cultural barriers. All of us speak the shared
language of safety and soundness.”33
Naturally, it is this shared
professional or expert culture which tends to secure a high level of
compliance with what a TRN produces as a normative output.34 Perhaps this
fidelity to network-generated norms can be said to result from a
bureaucratic habit or bureaucratic culture that is analogous to the “law
habit.”35
theoretical root of this transgovernmental regulatory network to the notion of “social
epistemes,” connoting both German tradition of viewing society as “comprising webs of
meaning and signification” and French tradition of exploring “mentalités collectives.”
Ruggie, supra note 19, at 157.
29
See Raustiala, supra note 19, at 6, 88 (identifying a “synergistic” relationship
between treaties and networks due to the former’s political and institutional contributions
to the latter).
30
Cho, supra note 19, at 402.
31
Keohane & Nye, Transgovernmental Relations, supra note 19, at 44.
32
Id. at 45; Peter Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination, 46 INT. ORG. 1 (1992).
33
John E. Shockey, Bank Regulatory Examination and Enforcement after Barings and
Daiwa, 935 PLI / CORP. 681, 708 (1996).
34
Here, the meaning of compliance is mostly limited to a soft dimension in the
absence of any technically binding force. If the concept of compliance involves a hard
(political) dimension, such as national legislation, as it often does in public international
law, it invites a whole range of different issues, such as the depth of compliance and the
measurement.
35
David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of
International Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 281, 303 n.189
(1998); Richard R. Baxter, International Law in "Her Infinite Variety", 29 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 549, 556 (1980). In building up such common belief and faith, another psychological
element, namely “trust” serves as an important catalyst. See Scott H. Jacobs, Why
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TRNs involve an ongoing dialogue, although the fora for that
dialogue may change.36 Early in the Seventies, Robert Keohane and Joseph
Nye, in their pioneering work, developed a notion of “complex
interdependence” ideal type of international relations, which correlated a
reluctance to resort to the use of force among a group of states with
“multiple channels of contact connecting societies.”37 A subset of their
notion of complex interdependence is the phenomenon of
“transgovernmental communication”, the existence of “informal ties
between government elites” and direct meetings and communications
between bureaucrats from different countries, which coexist with formal
foreign office arrangements.38 Raymond Hopkins also highlights this
dialogical process in developing working relationships through “telephone
calls, correspondence, regular meetings and pre-meeting agenda sessions.”39
TRNs work incrementally though day-to-day interactions. These
interactions are un-dramatic if not mundane, but they can have an enormous
affect.40 For example, the Supervisory Information Framework for
Derivatives and Trading Activities (Joint Report by the BCBS and the
Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO)), which was issued to the public on September
1998, was a revised version of an earlier similar report jointly published in
May 1995 by the same TRNs to assess the derivatives activities of banks
and securities firms.41 This revision represents on-going and cumulative
Governments Must Work Together, OECD OBSERVER No. 186 (Feb./Mar. 1994) at 14
[hereinafter Jacobs, Work Together]. Therefore, government officials may have to invest
more time in communicating better among each other as well as familiarizing themselves
with one another’s administrative style for the sake of a successful networking. Id. See also
Les Metcalfe, The Weakest Links: Building Organizational Networks for an Interdependent
World, in REGULATORY CO-OPERATION FOR AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 49, 57
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Economic Co-operation and
Development ed., 1994) (arguing that the establishment of “trust and confidence” among
the organizations participating in a regulatory system has an important bearing on the
reliability of an inter-organizational network). But see Jeffrey Atik, Science and
International Regulatory Convergence, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 736 (1996–97)
(questioning the possibility of expert consensus by arguing that “scientific consensus is
geographically distributed and flows from centers of influence.”).
36
Cho, supra note 19, at 403.
37
Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 25 (1977)
[hereinafter Keohane & Nye, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE]; Robert O. Keohane &
Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence Revisited, 41 INT’L ORG. 725, 731 (1987);
Slaughter, International Law, supra note 18, at 512–13.
38
Id., at 25–26; Slaughter, International Law, supra note 18, at 513.
39
Hopkins, supra note 19, at 36.
40
Cho, supra note 19, at 403.
41
THE BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION & THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE
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efforts by the BCBS and IOSCO with a view to keeping pace with an everchanging regulatory environment in this area, namely, “financial innovation
and progress in risk management field for trading and derivatives activities,
in particular with regard to market risk.” 42 It reflects earlier work of the two
TRNs including the 1994 Joint Release of Guidelines for improving risk
management of derivatives activities and subsequent risk management
guidance as well as the 1995 Joint Recommendations for Enhancing Public
Disclosure.43
Thus, we see the products of TRNs undergo evolution. This
evolutionary nature ensures streamlined and updated regulatory guidelines
so that policy measures reflect the ever-changing regulatory environment.
The Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (“APEC”) Forum provides
another apt example. APEC houses a variety of TRNs. It works through
everyday communications among sector-specific actors (government
officials and businessmen). In various subjects such as energy,
telecommunication or transportation functional Working Groups exist to
devise a detailed work program based on cooperation.44 The APEC Food
System (AFS) illustrates an evolution of a regulatory prototype. In 1999 the
APEC leaders adopted the AFS upon the recommendation by the APEC
Business Advisory Council (ABAC) in order to “efficiently link together
food production, food processing and consumption to meet the food needs
of our people as an essential part of achieving sustainable growth, equitable
development and stability in the APEC region.”45 The “Agricultural
Technical Cooperation Working Group (ATCWG)” is a key implementer of
the AFS recommendations concerning “efficiency in agricultural
production, supply and trade, including the importance of technology,
adding value to agricultural production and improving infrastructure.”46
This AFS/ATCWG network enabled APEC Senior Officials to review food
policies in the APEC area and establish the “APEC Food Security Work
OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMMISSIONS (“IOSCO”), FRAMEWORK FOR SUPERVISORY
INFORMATION
ABOUT
DERIVATIVES
AND
TRADING
ACTIVITIES
(1998),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs39.pdf.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
See Martin Rudner, Institutional Approaches to Regional Trade and Cooperation in
the Asia Pacific Area, 4 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 173–75 (1994).
“Consequently, unlike other formal international organizations, the APEC retains a strong
potential that regulatory challenges are duly ‘managed’, rather than ‘solved.’” Cho, supra
note 19, at 401.
45
Asia-Pacific
Economic
Cooperation,
APEC
Food
System,
http://www.apec.org/Groups/Other-Groups/APEC-Food-System.aspx (last visited on Oct.
31, 2010).
46
Id.
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Plan” in response to the rise in regional food prices in 2008.47
In conclusion, TRNs have been around for some time. They have
arisen in part in response to the weaknesses in the treaty system to tackle
pressing needs of globalization. They are also the function of professional
expert communities that share understandings and a desire to find solutions
to common problems. The means by which they find these solutions
involves a process, although a process that can be situated within a number
of institutional fora, or not. This process is dialogical, norm-generating, and
incremental and involves a number of tools that we refer to as intra-network
dynamics. The power of these networks results from the intra network
dynamics they foster and the end products that they develop.

II. A THEORY OF NETWORK COORDINATION: PRE-EXISTING NETWORKS,
REGULATORY PRODUCTS, AND OPERATIVE FRAMEWORKS
States can address complex problems through coordination of TRNs.
By constructing frameworks (or blueprints) that chart goals for various
TRNs, States can tackle complex systemic regulatory challenges. These
frameworks instruct TRNs to work towards specific goals. TRNs are wellsuited for the tasks assigned to them because of pre-existing relationships
and network dynamics of the network participants. These dynamics allow
TRNs to develop specific end products called “regulatory prototypes”
which can be absorbed into domestic structures through a variety of
strategies to fulfill the goals of the blueprint or framework. This
coordination of TRNs can lead to complex regulatory responses to global
problems that are well-suited for adoption at the national level. We probe
examples of this phenomenon in Part III. We discuss whether these
responses are desirable from a legitimacy and efficacy standpoint in Part
IV.
A. A Theory of TRN Coordination
TRN coordination involves governmental coalitions organizing
multifaceted responses to global regulatory challenges by leveraging the
capital of pre-existing networks to develop specific regulatory products
meant to be nationalized. Government groupings (such as the G7, G8 or the

47

Id.
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G20) have coordinated responses to political challenges or crisis.48 Using
action plans, called frameworks or blueprints, these groupings can instruct
multiple actors, and in particular TRNs, to take action simultaneously and in
pursuit of a common objective.
To tackle cross-border, cross-sectoral problems States sometimes
develop frameworks or blueprints, which embody basic agendas or action
plans, rather than specific standards. A coordinating coalition builds these
agendas and tasks various actors with the production of more specific
regulatory prototypes. These plans form in part out of a common
understanding of the problem and the need for a coordinated response.
International regulators, and even leaders, share a belief in the necessity of
these plans, they understand and agree that some regulations require not
only cross-border coordination but cross-network coordination.
Frameworks emerged long before the 2008 crisis.49 For example, in
1996 the G20 Finance Ministers created the Joint Forum, a blueprint of
collaboration amongst the BCBS, IOSCO and the IAIS. The Forum is
staffed by technical efforts from each of the parent’s organizations and its
blueprint requires that it focus on particular subjects of interests to each of
the parent entities, including risk assessment, capital adequacy and the
regulation of financial conglomerates.50 In short, the blueprint for the Joint
Forum recognized the need for a cross-sectoral approach on financial
conglomerates. The blueprint involves all three entities (the BCBS, IOSCO
and the IAIS) in an action plan that focuses on primarily two lines of
inquiry (capital risk and conglomerate supervision). 51
Frameworks are generally unambiguous since they set out specific
48

Robert P. Delonis, Note, International Financial Standards and Codes: Mandatory
Regulation Without Representation, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 563, 586–91 (2004). See
generally, Mario Giovanoli, The Reform of International Financial Architecture After the
Global Crisis, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 81 (2009).
49
As seen in the G7 or G8 experiences, major economies had tried to coordinate their
financial and macroeconomic policies in the past. See, e.g., JOHN KIRTON & ANTARA
HALDAR, G8 RESEARCH GROUP, G7/8 SUMMIT REMIT MANDATES, 1975–2003 (2003),
http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/factsheet/factsheet_remits.html (listing mandates
including, “At our next Summit, we will review progress on the implementation of the G8
Africa Action Plan on the basis of a final report from our Personal Representatives for
Africa,” “Our goal for the next Summit is to develop an international financing plan for
plutonium management and disposition based on a detailed project plan, and a multilateral
framework to co-ordinate this co-operation,” “We are determined to speed up the
implementation of our national plans called for under the Rio Climate Treaty and we will
each report what we have achieved at next year's Summit.”).
50
See Bank for International Settlements, Mandate of the Joint Forum,
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/jfmandate.htm (last visited Jan. 2. 2011).
51
Id.
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tasks for corresponding networks. Nonetheless they will lack the level of
technical precision required in the case of “regulatory prototypes.”52 While
these blueprints may assign each particular network a specific task, they
may still be silent exactly how such task will be operationalized. Initially,
though, the blueprint sets a plan at the network coordination level. Thus, it
is the first step in a multi-layered process of cross-networking.
Since a framework or blueprint denotes a “long-term” plan, its
actualization necessarily involves several incremental steps on different
levels, such as working-level officials, deputy ministers, ministers, and
leaders of the various TRNs. What is noteworthy is that these several
incremental processes may proceed at the same time through simultaneous
rounds of dialogue and communication among the network actors. It is in
this sense which a blueprint plants seeds for subsequent networking and
consequent regulatory prototype-building.
The individual TRNs gain strength and legitimacy from being part
of the overall plan in the same way that the overall plan legitimizes itself
through the use of the pre-existing networks. By infusing a large dose of
political capital in largely uncoordinated pre-existing sector-specific
government TRNs, States legitimize these networks while at the same time
leveraging their capital and legitimacy.
TRN capital results from their
prior workings and in particular results from complex intra-network
dynamics.
B. Intra-Network Dynamism
TRN coordination takes advantage of the pre-existing intra-network
dynamics that exists among networkers. These varying modes of internal
social dynamics represent different operationalizing forces in each network.
They are main engines of networks that the executive coordinator (G20)
maneuvers. While these dynamics have already been present in each
network before, it was the advent of the G20 which awakened their genuine
regulatory potential in an unprecedented endeavor to deliver desperate
regulatory effects to avert the financial crisis.
While TRN participants share mutual trust distilled from the same
expert belief, their knowledge base or experience may vary. Several
dynamics are at play as they work through these differences, we label them:
“persuasion,”
“negotiation,”
“strategic
co-optation,”
“willing
marginalization,” “responsive engagement” and “expert sympathization.”
These features fall neatly into a constructivist toolbox. Constructivist
scholars have long posited that institutions shape the preferences of
52

See infra notes 62 to 83 and accompanying text.
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participants.53 By indentifying the dynamics, the tools, the dialogues and
discourses that network players use to influence each other we hope to be
able to reveal how preferences may change – or appear to change.
Coordinated TRNs take advantage of these dynamics to pursue specific
regulatory end products that are part of a planned coordinated response to a
global problem. Unpacking the dynamics at work is important for the later
task of assessing the efficacy and legitimacy of the ultimate response.
First, participants in TRNs may simply influence (“persuade”) each
other into changing the other party’s regulatory behavior. Suppose that A is
a specific regulatory agency of Country X and B is a corresponding agency
in Country Y. By providing better regulatory information or more
advanced technology A can persuade B to adjust the latter’s original policy
stance. This type of interaction often leads to a diffusive and osmotic mode
of regulatory change, rather than a commandeering mode.54 Here, for
example it is entirely conceivable that a developed country member may
provide certain technical assistance or advice with a developing country
member to reinforce the former’s persuasive power. After all, networks can
explain more subtle dynamics than mere legislation in regulatory agencies’
behavioral change.55 To fully capture the intra-network dynamics behind
this regulatory persuasion, one needs to recall one of the defining
characteristics of a TRN discussed above, i.e., a social bond among sectorspecific government agencies or officials (networkers). This endogenous
nature of social interaction among networkers enables us to factor in the
“normative self-understanding of the ends held by the social groups in
question.” 56 This is why constructivism may provide a richer account than
conventional international relations theories, such as realism, as to the
“sticky”57 bond among social actors (here, networkers).58
53

See John Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and
the Social Constructivist Challenge, 52 INT'L ORG. 855, 856, 870 (1998); Alexander
Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the International State, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
384, 385–87 (1994); Claire Kelly, The Value Vacuum: Self-Enforcing Regimes and the
Dilution of the Normative Feedback Loop 22 MICH. J INT’L L. 673, 678 (2001).
54
Raustiala, supra note 19, at 51.
55
Id., at 54 (observing that networks “touch on issues such as the structure of
enforcement and the training of personnel.”).
56
Ruggie, supra note 53, at 860; see generally MAX WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (Edward A. Shils & Henry A. Finch, eds. & trans., 1949).
57
See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599, 2603 (1997).
58
This normative intersubjectivity generates “critical self-reflection” which “gives us
perspective on our social environment and helps us to overcome any false sense of
determinism.” ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 375
(1999).
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Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks present perhaps the strongest
version of persuasion. Adopting a sociological concept of “acculturation,”
they raise the possibility of social actors’ assimilation to the “beliefs and
behavioral patterns of the surrounding culture.”59 Interestingly, this
acculturation results more from a structural cognitive pressure to assimilate
within the group than from the “merits” of a particular model.60 Under this
circumstance, however, networking is prone to two types of criticism. First,
any behavioral change in this situation might be an ostensible conformity,
rather than a genuine modification of an earlier position.61 Second,
politically less powerful members of the group might be pressured into
accepting certain regulatory models prescribed by powerful members
without due consideration of actual merits of such models.62
Second, in some cases, A and B can “negotiate” over a common
subject and reach an agreement on the basis of quid pro quo. This may
occur in a “Record of Understanding (ROU)" or a “Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU)”. While this mode of interaction inevitably involves
some type of bargain, it should not necessarily be equated with a political,
strategic give-and-take process which is often seen in the conventional
international treaty negotiation. Importantly, an intra-network negotiation
need not be a zero sum gain. It involves the participants of the TRN
continuously adjusting their different interpretations and eventually
expanding their shared grounds. In this regard, an intra-network negotiation
may be understood as a “cross-persuasion”: one party’s persuasion is
contingent on that of the other party. The dynamic outcome of such
negotiation as a cross-persuasion is likely to be a positive-sum, which is
capable of generating regulatory convergence. For example, the U.S. might
accept the EU ’s position in favor of stricter CRA regulation in exchange
for the latter’s adoption of a variant of the former’s Volker rule.63
Third, a strategic co-optation can take place among network
participants. “Strategic co-optation,” as described by Selznick, is the
“process of absorbing new elements into the leadership of the policydetermining structure of an organization to avert threats to its stability or
existence.”64 For example, one network actor might invite another to serve
as a “policy advisor” for a regulatory project, perhaps because the first
59

Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 626 (2004).
60
Id. at 643.
61
Id.
62
See infra sub-pt. IV-B.
63
We owe Pierre-Hugues Verdier for this point.
64
See Ronald S. BURT, CORPORATE PROFITS AND COOPTATION 5 (1983).
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networker lacks the necessary capacity to act alone.65 This self-invoking
nature distinguishes co-optation from other modes of intra-network
dynamics, such as persuasion or negotiation, in which case the pressure for
regulatory behavioral change comes from outside.
Fourth, network members may engage in “willing marginalization.”
Willing marginalization happens when network members agree to
participate knowing that they will have limited influence. Members may be
motivated by the hope that even a reserved mode of participation now will
lead to greater future participation. Thus, suppose that a network member A
supports a position X, which is generally disfavored by another network
member B. Suppose further that B has very little influence. Here, B might
still welcome an invitation by A to collaborate. A may be engaging in a
persuasion leading to the willing marginalization of B. Lastly, network
members may face the real possibility that their choice is to simply remain
in the network, with limited influence, or be out of the network. Being in
the network may be the better alternative not only because they may hope
for greater influence in the future but because membership may signal
acceptance or other important values to other constituencies.66
Fifth, “responsive engagement” involves a rich set of regulatory
dialogues that could potentially result in a certain level of compromise even
though the negotiation is not completely successful. Although less than the
desired outcome is reached in responsive engagement, the process of
engaging itself moves the network forward. It signals that the parties are
willing to cooperate, at least on some issues, even if they are unsuccessful
on others for the time being. Given the network operation is a dynamic and
incremental process, responsive engagement is critical in maintaining a
stable level of sociological momentum regardless of any regulatory deal. In
other words, the network process is not a binary (on/off) communication but
a thread of mutually reinforcing engagement. When this interaction reaches
a certain critical point, a certain regulatory product, be it an MOU or a
policy guideline, tends to materialize.
Finally, a preliminary regulatory product molded initially by a
bilateral dialogue between A and B may spill over and be multilateralized
through like-minded regulators from other jurisdictions. This “expert
sympathization” is a necessary step to formulate any common regulatory
65

Sungjoon Cho, Non-Violation Issues in the WTO Framework: Are They the Achilles’
Heel of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process?, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 311, 346, n.188 (1998).
66
See Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of
International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 504 (2005) (arguing that one of the collateral
consequences of international organization membership, and commitment to its attendant
obligations, shapes the way other actors, States, NGO’s and domestic individuals, view the
state).
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guidelines or principles within a government network. This type of intranetwork dynamics can be found in most networks, such as the BCBS or the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which produce policy
guidelines or recommendations on a regular basis.
Importantly, these six types of intra-network dynamics offer useful
analytical lenses through which one can understand how a TRN functions in
an incremental, dialogical, and norm-generating manner. These tools are
inherently incremental in one can see how some modes are intermediary
steps in others. For example, a persuasion might lead to willing
marginalization. Responsive engagement is a step in negotiation. These
dynamics comprise the very dialogue of the TRNs. They are the substance
of the conferences, informal talks, and telephone calls. There are the
constituent parts of both the substantive outcomes and the process of
bringing the networks together. Eventually, these dynamics facilitate the
norm-generating process. They result in normative end products.
C. End Products: Regulatory Prototypes
TRNs create end products, which we label “regulatory
prototypes.”67 They generate rules, norms, or standards to deal with
specific problems they face. The regulatory prototype is often labeled as a
guideline or recommendation, which features the typical “soft law.” These
end products logically flow from the network operation that is dialogical,
incremental, and norm-generating.68 They fulfill the framework or blueprint
67

Other scholars have employed different terms. See e.g., Zaring, supra note 35, at 303
n.188 (citing Hal Scott, The Competitive Implications of the Basel Capital Accord, 39 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 885, 885 (1995) (referring to the Basel Accord as a “gentlemen’s agreement
among central banks.”)). See also JOSEPH JUDE NORTON, DEVISING INTERNATIONAL BANK
SUPERVISORY STANDARDS 176–77, 261–262 (1995); see Zaring, supra note 35, at 303
n.188 (“international soft law”). Cf. Linda M. Harasim, Global Networks: An Introduction,
in GLOBAL NETWORK: COMPUTERS AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION 13–14 (Linda
M. Harasim ed., 1993). Kumon and Aizu propose “co-emulation” as a strategy for
developing a global hypernetwork society of the future. To them, co-emulation is a
“response to the information age whereby nations can learn from one another to produce a
prototype socio-economic model that each country can mold to fit its unique history and
culture,” and it encourages nations to “move beyond competitive relationships into more
consensual relationships” to address a variety of socio-economic challenges of the twentyfirst century. See id. See also Eibe Riedel, Standards and Sources: Farewell to the
Exclusivity of the Sources Triad in International Law?, 2 EUR. J. INT’L L. 58, 79 (1991)
(discussing “new economic standards” with the proliferation of international economic
transactions).
68
This process can also be viewed as “dialectical” in the sense that this process
illustrates how prototypes can eventually be transformed into more acceptable, and in a
sense more legitimate, norms than one found in a conventional treaty. This dialectical
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established by the coordinating States.
A regulatory prototype, such as a guideline or a policy
recommendation, tends to represent a converging output of networking
results. Considering the incremental nature of networking, an overzealous
attempt to envisage quick regulatory change will be futile, or even
counterproductive.69 Yet, this circumspection does not necessarily mean
that a TRN always blocks participants from voluntarily adopting a more
advanced regulatory position. As discussed above, a variety of intranetwork dynamics, such as persuasion and responsive engagement,
encourage network participants to espouse the “best practices”, “regulatory
benchmarks” or “regulatory checklists,” which may even exceed the least
common denominators, so as to speedily achieve necessary regulatory
goals.70 While the regulatory prototype may be nonbinding,71 it also tends to

process represents the whole life cycle of a prototype throughout the sequence of its
creation, nationalization (where necessary), enforcement, surveillance, feedback and
establishment of a new prototype.
69
For instance, the “OECD Recommendation Concerning Effective Action Against
‘Hard Core’ Cartels” represents a minimum common denominator (“hard core” cartels) in
the competition policy area that results from a long-standing networking in this regulatory
field centering on the “OECD Committee on Competition Law and Policy” which brings
together the leaders of the world’s major competition, or antitrust, authorities and provides
the chief international forum for the regular exchange of views on important competition
policy
issues.
OECD,
Competition
Law
and
Policy:
About,
http://www.oecd.org/about/0,3347,en_2649_34685_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Jul.
13, 2011). See also OECD, Recommendation Concerning Effective Action Against Hard
Core
Cartels,
http://www.oecd.org/document/19/0,3746,en_2649_40381615_44942291_1_1_1_1,00.htm
l (last visited Jul. 13, 2011).
70
OECD, OECD Reference Checklist for Regulatory Decision-Making, available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/10/35220214.pdf (last visited July 26, 2011). However,
such “best practices” are not necessarily for the sake of harmonization, neither for
regulatory competition to a higher level of regulatory quality (race-to-the-top). Best
practices are just used as an example or a reference for a future design of a regulation. It
should be noted that under some circumstances “regulatory diversity” would be a better
option than harmonization or any other type of regulatory cooperation since the diversity of
preference, such as the degree of risk-taking is sometimes irreconcilable. Scott H. Jacobs,
Regulatory Competition for an Interdependent World: Issues for Government, in
REGULATORY COOPERATION FOR AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD, 15, 33 (1994). Cf. DAVID
VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY 6 (1995) (discussing the so-called “California effect” which means an upward
regulatory competition in the environmental policies among trading states in the US).
71
See OECD, Regulatory Reform and International Standardization, Working Party of
the Trade Committee, TD/TC/WP(98)36/FINAL, 28–32 (1999), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/19/1955309.pdf (discussing “regulators as players in
standardization.”).
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be technical and precise.72
Empirical confirmations of regulatory prototype are legion. For
example, the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision,
released by the BCBS on September 22, 1997, were intended to “serve as a
basic reference” for banking authorities throughout the world in supervising
and regulating banks and banking activities within their jurisdiction.73
Likewise, principles included in the Resolution on the Supervision of
Financial Conglomerates designed by IOSCO in October 1992 were
understood to “form the basis for the risk assessment of financial
conglomerates and to “guide the development of regulatory practice in the
area of financial conglomerates.74 The APEC network serves as another
example. One of the most representative sectors in the APEC in which such
guidelines and principles proliferate is the "standards and conformances"
sector. The Sub-committee on Standards and Conformance75 completed
Guidelines for the Preparation, Adoption and Review of Technical
Regulations and APEC Food MRA (Mutual Recognition Arrangement)
Supplementary Material in 1997.76Regardless of its technical format, the
normative value of this prototype can be advanced by the very fact that
expert participants of the network sharing the common belief have worked
72

Cho, supra note 19, at 403.
Statement of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, BANK FOR INT’L
SETTLEMENTS, Jan. 19, 1998, http://www.bis.org/press/p980119.htm [hereinafter Press
Release, Basel Committee].
74
INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMMISSIONS (IOSCO), A RESOLUTION ON THE SUPERVISION OF
FINANCIAL
CONGLOMERATES
(1992)
http://www.iosco.org/library/resolutions/pdf/IOSCORES7.pdf. More recently, the IOSCO
documented a comprehensive set of 30 principles of securities regulations, which are based
on three fundamental objectives of securities regulation—the protection of investors;
ensuring that markets are fair, efficient and transparent; the reduction of systemic risk.
INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMMISSIONS (IOSCO), OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES
REGULATION (2003) http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf (last
visited on Oct. 31, 2010). These 30 principles—grouped into eight categories (principles
relating to the regulator; principles for self-regulations; principles for the enforcement of
securities regulation; principles for cooperation in regulation; principles for issuers;
principles for collective investment schemes; principles for market intermediaries;
principles for the secondary market)—are to be nationalized in due forms considering
domestic legal structure and other circumstances. Id.
75
The Sub-committee on Standards and Conformance (SCSC) was established under
the committee for Trade and Investment (CTI), inter alias, to encourage alignment of
members’ standards with international standards and to achieve mutual recognition among
APEC economies of conformity assessment in regulated and voluntary sectors.
76
See Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, The Sub-Committee on Standards and
Conformance,
http://www.apec.org/Groups/Committee-on-Trade-and-Investment/SubCommittee-on-Standards-and-Conformance.aspx (last visited on Oct. 31, 2010).
73
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out this prototype via various modes of dynamics.77
Guidelines or recommendation prototypes are designed to be
nationalized.78 Under certain circumstances, a soft prototype may be
hardened as a part (or a whole) of a statute in the domestic legal system.79
77

See also Slaughter, Government Networks, supra note 18, at 211 (arguing for
effectiveness of the Basel Committee’s system of enforcement despite its informality). In
this sense, one might reasonably speculate that such prototype (soft law) would form a new
pattern of “custom” in terms of public international law since the requirements of both
established practice and opinio juris would be met because transgovernmental regulators
repetitively refer to those prototypes with a strong normative attitude regardless of its
technical non-bindingness. Cf. Stephen Zamora, Is There Customary International
Economic Law?, 32 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 9, 34–5 (1989) (discussing the “soft law”
nature of customary international economic law). As a matter of fact, this regulatory
prototype corresponds to the current reality of harmonization as seen, for example, in the
EU context. Contemporary regulatory harmonization is conducted not in light of
“specification” standards, but in light of “performance” standards. Giandomenico Majone,
Comparing Strategies of Regulatory Rapprochement, in REGULATORY COOPERATION FOR
AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD, 155, 163–5 (1994). In other words, instead of attempting to
universalize regulatory standards based on detailed specifications, certain “essential
requirements” based on functions or performances are highlighted. Id. Regarding the “New
Approach” to technical harmonization and standardization, see EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
GUIDE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVES BASED ON THE NEW APPROACH AND THE
GLOBAL APPROACH 7 (2000),
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/single-marketgoods/files/blue-guide/guidepublic_en.pdf [hereinafter Guide]. In turn, this approach
focusing on essential requirements provides ample room for regulatory maneuvering in
implementation stage on a case-by-case basis. Accordingly, the concept of “equivalency”
becomes critical in assessing regulations of different jurisdictions and in determining
whether a certain regulation is compatible with a harmonized standard. See e.g.,
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1 A, 1867
U.N.T.S. at 493, art. 6. This determination is called a “conformity assessment” process. See
Guide, supra note 77, at 8 (regarding the “Global Approach” to certification and testing
related to conformity assessment). Therefore, regulatory prototypes symbolize the current
harmonization practices in the sense that they represent essential regulatory requirements
as principles or guidelines and implementation details are left to each domestic authority.
Zaring, Rulemaking and Adjudication, supra note 2, at 580–87.
78
Slaughter submits that this “nationalization of international law” is an important
dimension of effectiveness of government networks. She argues that:
“The result is an international rule-making process that directly engages national
officials and national promulgation and enforcement mechanisms, without formal
translation and implementation mechanisms form the international to the
national.” Slaughter, Government Networks, supra note 18, at 217.
Roberta S. Karmel & Claire R. Kelly, The Hardening of Soft Law in Securities
Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 883, 924–25 (2009).
79
Malloy emphasized on the importance of such “hardening ” process crystallizing
into the implementation and enforcement. Regarding the BIS capital adequacy guidelines
and the Second Banking Directive in the EC, he argues that successful implementation and
enforcement of these two initiatives may provided the basis for the future development of a
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Notably, certain TRNs provide a variety of strategies to encourage
participants to implement and enforce these prototypes in the domestic
dimension. For example, they request participants to perform selfevaluations to monitor their compliance with those prototypes.80 Harold
Koh depicts this implementation aspect as a “transnational legal process” in
which “norm-entrepreneurs” from an “interpretive community” mobilize
issue networks to embed these regulatory prototypes in the domestic legalpolitical system via a series of socialization processes, such as interaction,
interpretation and internalization.81
Interestingly, these soft prototypes can also be hardened in the
subsequent treaty-making process. As Kal Raustiala aptly observes, “soft
law is often seen as a stepping-stone to hard law, permitting states to begin
cooperation informally when they fear the impact of a fully legally binding
commitment.”82 This soft law-turned-treaty phenomenon is particularly
fathomable considering the fact that treaties often support the formation of
networks by supplying to the latter political support (in terms of acceptance
or acquiescence of network phenomena) as well as institutional support (in
terms of personnel and budget).83
“strong force” converged pattern of regulation. Michael P. Malloy, Bumper Cars: Themes
of Convergence in International Regulation, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. S1, S21 (1992).
However, the hardening process may be hard in a constitutional matter because many
supervisory authorities, e.g., central banks, may not have legislative competence to convert
those guidelines or principles into a hard statute. Press Release, Basel Committee, supra
note 73. Nonetheless, the Basel Committee keeps on monitoring the application of such
principles “in all material aspects” and indirectly presses domestic legislators to harden
such soft laws. Id.
80
See.e.g., IOSCO, Report on the Self-Evaluation Conducted by IOSCO Members
Pursuant to the 1994 IOSCO Resolution on “Commitment to Basic IOSCO Principles of
High Regulatory Standards and Mutual Cooperation and Assistance (Nov. 1997), available
at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD76.pdf (last visited on July 26,
2011).
81
Koh, supra note 57, at 2602, 2648, 2639.
82
Raustiala, supra note 19, at 86; Karmel & Kelly, supra note 78, at 924–25.
83
Raustiala, supra note 19, at 88. In sum, two dominant courses may encapsulate the
soft norm-generating mechanism within a government network. First, a contextualized rule
(a rule that depends on the circumstance, such as a particular national regulation) may get
decontextualized as its core precepts (general principles) are abstracted. As an initial
normative reference, those contextualized norms are often labeled “best practices” or
“templates.” Second, network participants discuss and debate on these de-contextualized
rules (principles) and embody a regulatory prototype. This prototype is a “model” for
future application—e.g. maybe a model law on cross border insolvency. This prototype can
then be re-contextualized or nationalized later in each jurisdiction through various
transmission mechanisms. For example, it can be transformed into a domestic statute (from
soft to hard) or a domestic administrative guideline (from soft to soft). See ROBERT Y.
JENNINGS, THE PROGRESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 48 (1960) (stating that “development of

PLEASE DO NOT DISTRIBUTE OR QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR

26

NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

III.

[9-Aug-11

COORDINATING NETWORKS: THE G20 AS A CASE STUDY

The G20 Leaders evolved from a rather mundane network of
Finance Ministers to a unique leaders group functioning as an executive
coordinator of a response to the financial crisis of 2008. The G20 Leaders
coordinate the activities of the Banking and Finance Ministers, the
Securities Commissioners, the Insurance Network and the Trade Network.
Chronicling the G20’s development as an TRN coordinator, and reviewing
its coordination of these various issue-specific networks, allows us view
examples of intra-network dynamics and raise questions concerning the
implications of these dynamics. What is new to us concerns the unique
“executive” role self-imposed on the G20 to steer this largely discrete set of
sector-specific TRNs into a coherent fashion under a long-term timehorizon. We explore the implications of this coordination in light of the
network dynamics at play in the TRNs in Part IV.
A. The Evolution of the G20 into a Coordinating Executive
For some time, groups of countries have coordinated both economic
and foreign affairs policies using periodic meetings of high level officials.
These “G” (for Group) meetings started in the 1970s with the G5 (France,
Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States) discussing
financial and economic matters.84 The meetings involve meetings among
heads of state. This group expanded to the G7 in the 1980’s (adding Canada
and Italy). Russia joined the group, leading to the G8 in 1998 (at least for
economic matters).85 In 1999, partially in response to the Asian Financial
the law may indeed at first seem to make the law less rather than more certain for it is not
unlike metal being tempered for a new purpose, and may have to be softened before it can
be reshaped and hardened.”). Cf. Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87
AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 551 (1993) (arguing that “the augmented role of multilateral forums in
devising, launching, refining and promoting general international law has provided the
international community with a more formal lawmaking process that is often used.”). Of
course, after this re-contextualization, feedback can also help shape the original prototype
to further improve.
84
Peter I. Hajnal, THE G8 SYSTEM AND THE G20: EVOLUTION, ROLE, AND
DOCUMENTATION 12 (Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 2007)
85
Id. at 28. In terms of economic matter discussed the group dealt with issues such as
exchange rates and balance of payments. See, e.g., Declaration of Rambouillet, Nov. 17,
1975, http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/1975rambouillet/communique.html (last visited
Jul. 18, 2011); Announcement of the Ministers of Finance and Central Bank Governors of
France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Plaza Accord), Sept.
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Crisis, the G-2086 group formed to bring together finance ministers and
central bank governors from both developed and emerging economies.87
Notably, unlike the G7 meetings, the G-20 meetings were originally
conducted by the “finance” ministers of the various participants, not the
heads of state.88 The G20 structure emphasized the importance of emerging
economies in global economic issues.89 The finance ministers and central
bank governors would typically meet once a year.90
Prior to the 2008 financial crisis the finance ministers and central bank
governors had met regularly since the Asian Financial Crisis of 1999. 91
These meetings addressed issues such as financial sector regulation and
supervision,92 terrorist financing,93 and the reform of the Bretton Woods
22, 1985, http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/fm850922.htm (last visited Jul. 18, 2011);
Statement of the G6 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (Louvre Accord), Feb.
22, 1987, http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/finance/fm870222.htm (last visited Jul. 18, 2011).
86
The members of the G-20 are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France,
Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa,
Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, and the European Union. The European
Union is by the rotating presidency of the European Council presidency and the European
Central
Bank.
About
G-20,
What
is
the
G-20,
http://www.g20.org/about_what_is_g20.aspx (last visited May 23, 2011). Additionally
Spain and the Netherlands have attended as observers. The following organizations have
also attended as observers: the European Commission, the European Council. The
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the New Partnership for Africa’s Development
(NEPAD), the United Nations, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization.
JENILEE GUEBERT, G20 RESEARCH GROUP, PLANS FOR THE THIRD G20 SUMMIT:
PITTSBURGH
2009,
44–45
(2009)
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/g20plans/g20leaders090818.pdf.
87
See G20 Home, G20.ORG, http://www.g20.org (last visited Jan. 2, 2011).
88
See REBECCA M. NELSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE G-20 AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC COOPERATION: BACKGROUND AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CONGRESS 1 (2010),
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40977.pdf.
89
Id. at 4 (noting that emerging economies have become more “active in the
international economy.”).
90
About G-20, What is the G-20, supra note 86 (discussing the normal practices for
meetings and activities).
91
Initially the G20 started out as the G22 and was formed for a one-time meeting. It
briefly became the G33 and finally upon the recommendation of the G7 finance ministers
became the G20. See Hajnal, supra note 84, at 151–52; see also G-20, COMMUNIQUÉ: G-20
FINANCE
MINISTERS
AND
CENTRAL
BANK
GOVERNORS
(1999)
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/1999/1999communique.pdf [hereinafter G-20 COMMUNIQUÉ
1999]. Deputies met twice a year to prepare for the ministerial meeting. See Hajnal, supra
note 84, at 1. The G20 also organizes various technical seminars throughout the year. Id.
The meetings are not open to the public.
92
See G-20 COMMUNIQUÉ 1999, supra note 91.
93
G-20, COMMUNIQUÉ: G-20 FINANCE MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK GOVERNORS,
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institutions.94 An important turning point for the prominence and future of
the G20 came with the 2008 financial crisis. As the crisis deepened, the G7
leaders decided to convene a “summit” of the leaders of the G20 countries.
In 2008, George W. Bush called for the first G20 Leaders Summit to be
held in Washington D.C.95 Since the first summit in November 2008 in
Washington, there have been four others: London (2009), Pittsburgh (2009),
Toronto (2010) and Seoul (2010). The G20 leaders will begin meeting once
annually, in the fall, beginning in France in 2011. Mexico will chair the
G20 in 2012.”96
The first three G20 Summits moved the group from a crisis responder to
a premiere economic institutional forum. 97 The first summit focused on
“short and medium term responses to the crisis”;98 the second reached
agreement on crisis management; and the third created a “new framework to
correct global imbalances, taking steps to address food security issues, and
eliminating fossil fuel subsidies.”99 The third and fourth summits in
particular solidified the G20 network as an executive coordinator of
(2001) http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2001/2001communique.pdf; G-20, COMMUNIQUÉ:
MEETING
OF
MINISTERS
AND
GOVERNORS
IN
MELBOURNE
(2006),
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2006/2006communique.pdf.
94
G20, COMMUNIQUÉ: MEETING OF FINANCE MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK
GOVERNORS (2005), http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2005/2005communique.pdf.
95
Alan S. Alexandroff & John Kirton, The Great Recession and the Emergence of the
G-20 Leaders’ Summit, in RISING STATES, RISING INSTITUTIONS: CHALLENGES FOR
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 180 (Alan S. Alexandroff & Andrew F. Cooper eds., 2010).
96
John Kirton, What is the G20?, http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/g20whatisit.html (last
visited Jul. 15, 2011).
97
Foreign policy issues remain the purview of the G-7 and G-8. NELSON, supra note
88, at 1.
98
Id.
99
See e.g., G-20, THE TORONTO SUMMIT DECLARATION at Preamble ¶ 9, (2010)
http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_declaration_en.pdf. See also G-20, THE SEOUL
SUMMIT
DECLARATION
at
¶
51(e),
(2010)
http://www.g20.org/Documents2010/11/seoulsummit_declaration.pdf
(discussing
an
enhanced food security policy) [hereinafter TORONTO SUMMIT DECLARATION]; see also id.
at ¶ 58 (discussing the phase out of fossil fuel subsidies). See also Daniel Cohn-Bendit &
Rebecca Harms, Outcome of the G20 Summit in Pittsburgh (24–25 September 2009),
EUROPEAN FREE ALLIANCE, Sept. 29, 2009, http://www.greens-efa.eu/fr/outcome-of-theg20-summit-in-pittsburgh-24-25-september-2009-1238.html (discussing the framework for
green and global recovery); see also G-20, LEADERS’ STATEMENT THE PITTSBURGH
SUMMIT: SEPTEMBER 24–25 2009, ¶ 39 and Preamble ¶ 24, (2009)
http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh_summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf.
See
also The G-20 Summit in Toronto: Acting on Our Global Energy and Climate Change
Challenges, THE WHITE HOUSE, June 27, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/g-20-summit-toronto-acting-our-global-energy-and-climate-change-challenges
(discussing the background of the Pittsburgh Summit).
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international economic policy-making and began a process of extending its
reach to other non-financial issue areas for sustainable development, such as
energy policy and food security.
Markedly, each of the Leaders’ Summits displayed the G20’s
utilization of previously established TRNs to an incrementally increasing
degree. The Washington Summit (2008) dealt with crisis management.100
The leaders agreed to commit “sufficient resources” to the IMF, World
Bank and other development banks so that they could adequately respond to
the crisis.101 While the participants had varying views on the need for a new
global financial architecture, they finally hammered out one version.102 The
European view favored a more comprehensive international financial
architecture, while the US and Canada envisioned a more gradual process of
coordination.103 Discussion between the IMF and the Financial Stability
Forum (FSF) resulted in a division of labor and the expansion of the FSF.104
The leaders sought to stabilize the financial system, recognize the
importance of stimulus to the economy, pledge support to “have sufficient
resources to continue playing their role in overcoming the crisis.”105 As
part of the new blueprint, the leaders committed to implement policies
consistent with an array of broad yet common principles.106 The principles
included: strengthening transparency and accountability;107 enhancing
sound regulation;108 promoting integrity in financial markets;109 reinforcing
100

See G-20, DECLARATION: SUMMIT ON FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE WORLD
ECONOMY (2008), www.g20.org/Documents/g20_summit_declaration.pdf.
101
Id. at ¶ 7.
102
Id.
103
Alexandroff & Kirton, supra note 95, at 181.
104
Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy:
Washington
DC,
November
15,
2008,
¶
8,
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2008/2008declaration1115.html [hereinafter WASHINGTON
DECLARATION]. As Alexandroff and Kirton explained the plan was to have a lightly
institutionalized FSF would set new standards, but the organizationally powerful IMF
would then monitor and enforce compliance with them. Alexandroff & Kirton, supra note
95, at 183.
105
WASHINGTON DECLARATION, supra note 104.
106
Id. (discussing the Common Principles for Reform of Financial Markets).
107
This mainly entails “enhancing required disclosure on complex financial products
and ensuring complete and accurate disclosure by firms of their financial conditions.
Incentives should be aligned to avoid excessive risk-taking.” Id.
108
This measure is aimed at “strengthen[ing] our regulatory regimes, prudential
oversight, and risk management, and ensure that all financial markets, products and
participants are regulated or subject to oversight, as appropriate to their circumstances.” Id.
109
This aims primarily at “bolstering investor and consumer protection, avoiding
conflicts of interest, preventing illegal market manipulation, fraudulent activities and
abuse, and protecting against illicit finance risks arising from non-cooperative
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international cooperation; 110 and reforming international financial
institutions.111 To implement these principles for reform, the leaders set out
an action plan that contained immediate and medium-term items with more
specificity.112
At the London Summit (2009), the theme of crisis management
continued, but the group also set goals for long-term planning and policy
coordination.113 Given the more long-term view on this summit, it is not
surprising that some divergence in policy perspectives and priorities
emerged. For example, the U.S. focused its attention more on stimulus
while the EU sought better global regulation.114 Emerging powers sought
progress on “trade openness, trade finance, development, and reform of
international financial institutions.” 115 Still other powers, including the UK,
broached the subject of adding climate change to the talks.116
jurisdictions.” Id.
110
This will facilitate “coordination and cooperation across all segments of financial
markets, including with respect to cross-border capital flows.” Id.
111
The goal is to “reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions so that they can more
adequately reflect changing economic weights in the world economy in order to increase
their legitimacy and effectiveness. [E]merging and developing economies, including the
poorest countries, should have greater voice and representation.” Id.
112
See generally id.
113
G-20 LEADERS, THE GLOBAL PLAN FOR RECOVERY AND REFORM, ¶¶ 2, 4 (2009),
http://www.g20.org/pub_communiques.aspx [hereinafter Recovery and Reform].
114
Rich Miller & Simon Kennedy, G-20 Shapes New World Order With Lesser Role
for
U.S
Markets,
BLOOMBERG,
Apr.
2,
2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=axEnb_LXw5yc&refer=ho
me (discussing the U.S. taking the lead in getting the summit to agree on an increase in
IMF rescue funds to $750 billion from $250 billion now); Associated Foreign Press, G20
Needs to Act: Action on Global Financial Crisis: Analysts, WATODAY (Austl.), Apr. 1,
2009,
http://www.watoday.com.au/world/g20-needs-to-act-action-on-global-financialcrisis-analysts-20090401-9jor.html (discussing the divide between United States and
Europe); Steve Richards, Woolly Words Expose Weakness of Leaders' Convictions, INDEP.,
Apr. 2, 2009, http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/steve-richards/steverichards-woolly-words-expose-weakness-ofleaders-conviction
s-1659990.html
(discussing Brown's and Obama's uncertainties going into the summit); José Barrosco, EU
Commission President, Declaration on the preparation of the G20 Summit, (Mar. 24, 2009)
(transcript available at http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_8601_en.htm)
(Illustrating EU’ s urging for a Global Response).
115
Alexandroff & Kirton, supra note 95, at 185; Lee Hudson Teslik, Council on
Foreign
Relations:
20
Agendas
at
G-20,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/18997/twenty_agendas_at_g20.html (last visited Jul. 14,
2011).
116
GORDON BROWN, THE UK CABINET OFFICE, SUPPORTING GLOBAL GROWTH: A
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE RESPONSIVENESS AND ADAPTABILITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS,
5,
7
(2009),

http://www.g20.org/Documents/cabinet_office_supporting_global_growth_0909.pdf
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Despite these divides, the summit was a success because the G20s
maintained its role as an executive coordinator and orchestrated a response
to the crisis.117 The leaders laid a framework or blueprint for the various
sector-specific networks, such as banking and securities networks, to follow
as they develop more specific regulatory prototypes with which to achieve
corresponding regulatory goals. For example, the leaders facilitated the
operation of a financial network by creating the Financial Stability Board
(FSB) as the successor to the Financial Stability forum (FSF).118 The FSB
was asked to partner with the IMF as a monitoring entity.119 The G20 also
agreed to increase funding for the IMF.120 It endorsed the OECD efforts to
“take action against non-cooperative jurisdictions including tax havens.”121
It again called on accounting bodies to coordinate with supervisors and
regulators to improve standards.122 Furthermore, the London Summit
committed to concluding the Doha Round,123 a commitment which the G20
later backed off,124reasserted125 and then reaffirmed.126 It also reaffirmed
(discussing climate change).
117
See Prime Minister Hails Success of G–20 London Summit,
http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=2507 (last visited Jul. 6, 2011); Obama Hails London
Summit as Start of Economic Turnaround, CBC NEWS, Apr. 2, 2009,
http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/04/02/g20-obama.html; ERIC HELLEINER & PAOLA
SUBACCHI, THE CENTER FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION, FROM LONDON TO
L’AQUILA: BUILDING A BRIDGE BETWEEN THE G20 AND THE G8 (2009),
http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/CH%20London%20to%20Laquila%20WEB.p
df.
118
Recovery and Reform, supra note 113, at ¶ 15; History of Financial Stability Board,
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/history.htm (last visited Jul. 6, 2011)
[hereinafter HISTORY OF FSB].
119
Recovery and Reform, supra note 118; HISTORY OF FSB, supra note 118.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Recovery and Reform, supra note 118, at ¶ 23; HISTORY OF FSB, supra note 118.
The Leaders saw the importance of not only confronting the present crisis but of
forestalling protectionist policies that could worsen it. At the London Summit the G20
asked the WTO along with UNCTAD and the OECD to “monitor and report publicly on
G20 adherence to their undertakings on resisting protectionism and promoting global trade
and investment.” See OECD, WTO, UNCTAD, REPORT ON G20 TRADE AND INVESTMENT
MEASURES 3 (2009), http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wto_oecd_unctad2009_en.pdf;
OECD, WTO, UNCTAD, Report on G20 Trade and Investment (Sept. 2009 to Feb. 2010),
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wto_oecd_unctad2010d1_en.pdf.
124
THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT AT A CRITICAL JUNCTURE: MDG
GAP
TASK
FORCE
REPORT
31
(2010),
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/mdg_gap/mdg_gap2010/mdg8report2010_
engw.pdf (“the goal set by the G-20 to conclude the negotiations in 2010 appears
unrealizable, and no new deadline has been set.”).
125
TORONTO SUMMIT DECLARATION, supra note 99, at ¶ 38.

PLEASE DO NOT DISTRIBUTE OR QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR

32

NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

[9-Aug-11

the commitment to reach the Millennium Development Goals127and to work
towards a successful plan to cope with climate change.128
The Progress Report following the London Summit attests to the
G20 efforts to harness the resources of various TRNs. With the ongoing
prompting and guidance of the G20, these networks kept generating various
regulatory prototypes. For example, the BCBS issued Final Capital
Requirements Standards for Re-securitizations and Enhanced Risk
Management Requirements around Structured Products and Off-balance
Sheet Activities.129 IOSCO published Interim Recommendations about
Regulatory Approaches to Be Implemented in the Securitization Markets.130
Subsequently, IOSCO finalized its Report on Good Practices in relation to
Investment Managers Due Diligence when investing in Structured Finance
Instruments.131
Motivated by the success of the London Summit, the Pittsburgh
Summit (2009) revealed even more ambitious blueprints.132 The leaders
officially ordained the G20 as the premier forum for international economic
coordination.133
They stressed the importance of increasing the
representation of emerging-market countries at the IMF,134 as well as
specific commitment on a host of new policy areas, including economic
development and the environment.135 In addition to reforming the IMF, the
Summit announced plans for reform of the development banks. Specifically,
the G20 called upon the World Bank to strengthen its focus on food
security, human development, economic growth for the poor; and financing
a green economy.136 The emphasis of the Leaders’ Statement was on
forward-looking sustainable development, launching the Framework for

126

THE SEOUL SUMMIT DECLARATION, supra note 99, at ¶ 43.
Recovery and Reform, supra note 113, at ¶ 25.
128
Id. at ¶ 28.
129
G-20, PROGRESS REPORT ON THE ACTIONS OF THE LONDON AND WASHINGTON G20
SUMMITS,
¶
48
(2009),
http://www.g20.org/Documents/20090905_G20_progress_update_London_Fin_Mins_final
.pdf [hereinafter LONDON AND WASHINGTON PROGRESS REPORT].
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
The Leaders announced the summit as turning the page “on the era of
irresponsibility.” LEADERS STATEMENT, THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT, at Preamble, ¶ 1
(2009), http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh_summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf
[hereinafter THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT].
133
Id.
134
Id. at ¶ 1, 20.
135
See, e.g., id. at Annex ¶ 5.
136
Id. at ¶¶ 1, 24–29.
127
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Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth.137 In ushering in these ambitious
blueprints, the G20 leaders attempted to coordinate, cross-link, and micromanage various networks and entities. For example, leaders
asked the IMF to assist our Finance Ministers and Central
Bank Governors in this process of mutual assessment by
developing a forward-looking analysis of whether policies
pursued by individual G-20 countries are collectively
consistent with more sustainable and balanced trajectories
for the global economy, and to report regularly to both the
G-20 and the International Monetary and Financial
Committee (IMFC), building on the IMF’s existing bilateral
and multilateral surveillance analysis, on global economic
developments, patterns of growth and suggested policy
adjustments. Our Finance Ministers and Central Bank
Governors will elaborate this process at their November
meeting and we will review the results of the first mutual
assessment at our next summit. 138
With respect to its efforts on energy and sustainable development,
G20 tapped into preexisting entities. “We request relevant institutions, such
as the IEA, OPEC, OECD, and World Bank, provide an analysis of the
scope of energy subsidies and suggestions for the implementation of this
initiative and report back at the next summit.” 139
The G20 progress reports play an important role in “monitoring”
and moving blueprints forward. The Progress Reports closely detail the
work of BCBS, the FSB, the finance ministers, IAIS, IOSCO, IASB, and
the BIS among others.140 For example, the Progress report notes the
pressing need for supervision and monitoring to combat systemic risk by
nearly every network. 141 It chronicles various TRN efforts, such as the
IOSCO’s Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation (recognizing
the need to confront systemic risk); the BCBS’ investigation of systemic
funding liquidity risks; the FSB and IMF’s monitoring of data gaps, and the
IAIS beginning investigation of systemic risks. 142
The Toronto Summit (2010) re-affirmed the G20’s role as a premier
137

Id. at ¶ 5.
Id. at Annex page 6 at ¶ 6.
139
Id. at Annex page 14 at ¶ 30.
140
See, e.g., LONDON AND WASHINGTON PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 129, at ¶¶ 65,
71, 82–88.
141
Id. at 65.
142
Id.
138

PLEASE DO NOT DISTRIBUTE OR QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR

34

NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

[9-Aug-11

forum for international economic cooperation.143 By accepting the
recommendations from Labor and Employment Ministers who had met in
April,144 the G20 demonstrated that it did factor in social implications of
economic growth and development. It also marked the completion of peer
review mechanism, the Mutual Assessment Process (MAP),145 under which
the G20 can collectively evaluate each member’s record of compliance with
previous blueprints and regulatory prototypes. Relying upon IMF and
World Bank assessment, the leaders suggested that a more ambitious plan
would result in a speedier, more sustainable, and more equitable
recovery.146 Leaders agreed to at least halve deficits by 2013 and stabilize
or reduce government debt to GDP ratios by 2016.”147
The evaluation on the Seoul Summit (2010) has been mixed. One of
the pressing issues facing the leaders was currency imbalances and the
summit failed to deliver a solution, although it did pledge to develop
indicative guidelines to address global imbalances.148 Nonetheless, some
have noted that the summit eased tensions amongst countries over
quantitative easing and currency devaluation.149 Given the incremental
nature of the G20 operation, one might not be too disappointed with these
efforts. Moreover, there were some more concrete accomplishments that
built upon prior work.150 In particular, the Summit officially endorsed
Basel III and emphasized the continued importance of macro-prudential

143

TORONTO SUMMIT DECLARATION, supra note 99, at ¶ 1.
Id., at ¶ 5.
145
See Factsheet: The G-20 Mutual Assessment Process, International Monetary
Fund, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/g20map.htm (last visited Jul 15, 2011).
146
TORONTO SUMMIT DECLARATION, supra note 99, at ¶ 9.
147
Id., at ¶ 10.
148
See generally Laurence Norman and Ian Talley, No deal: Seoul’s G20 summit fails
to deliver on currencies, trade imbalances, THE AUSTRALIAN, November 12, 2010,
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/markets/no-deal-seouls-g20-summit-fails-todeliver-on-currencies-trade-imbalances/story-e6frg926-1225952694281; and G20 Summit:
No
accord
on
‘currency
values’
or
imbalances,
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/resurgence/2010/244/econ1.htm (last visited June 3, 2011)
(discussing how the 11-12 November Seoul Summit was unable to establish a solution to
the differences on currency values or global imbalances but agreed to develop guidelines).
149
See G20 Agree to Move toward more Market-driven Exchange Rate,
http://english.cri.cn/6826/2010/11/12/2741s604727.htm (last visited June 4, 2011) (noting
that the Seoul Summit was held amid tensions among G20 nations on several issues, but
the nations were able to find a medium on many controversial issues).
150
Preparations for the G20 Seoul Summit in November and its Agenda, KOREA IT
TIMES, May 10, 2010, http://www.koreaittimes.com/story/8713/preparations-g20-seoulsummit-november-and-its-agenda (discussing the agenda for the G20 Seoul Summit and
noting that 60% to 70% of the agenda built off the agendas from prior summit meetings).
144
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frameworks such at the IMF’s MAP.151
The Seoul Summit perhaps best highlights the successes and
limitations of the G20 in coordinating the many diverse networks at its
disposal. True, the G20 was instrumental in merging its political will and
breadth during times of crisis. At the same time, however, the networks at
its disposal act incrementally as they build upon a history of work and
relevant epistemic communities. As the crisis has subsided, efforts to
coordinate beyond the exigency tend to face greater political hurdles.152
151

See Did the G20 Lose its Seoul?, SEEKING ALPHA, November 21, 2010,
http://seekingalpha.com/article/237890-did-the-g20-lose-its-seoul (highlighting the role of
the G20 at the Seoul Summit and its endorsement of Basel III and restructuring of IMF).
See also The Basel iii Accord: The new Basel iii framework, http://www.basel-iiiaccord.com/ (last visited June 3, 2011) (noting that the G20 leaders officially endorsed the
Basel III framework at the November 2010 Seoul Summit); and John Lipsky, The PostSummit
Prospects
for
Policy
Cooperation,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2010/112310.htm (last visited June 3, 2011)
(discussing that the G20 Leaders affirmed the importance of MAP at the Seoul Summit).
152
Roya Wolverson, G20’s Tepid Economic Reform, COUNS. ON FOREIGN REL., Oct.
25, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/economics/g20s-tepid-economic-reform/p23218 (“The G20
finance meeting this weekend in Gyeongju, South Korea, failed to produce concrete
measures to tame worsening trade and currency imbalances . . .”); Paul Krugmann, The
Third
Depression,
N.Y.
TIMES,
June
27,
2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/28/opinion/28krugman.html?scp=7&sq=g20%20failure
&st=cse (“[M]ost recently at last weekend’s deeply discouraging G-20 meeting —
governments are obsessing about inflation when the real threat is deflation, preaching the
need for belt-tightening when the real problem is inadequate spending.”); Simon Johnson,
Capital
Failure,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Nov.
11,
2010,
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/11/capitalfailure/?scp=1&sq=g20%20failure&st=cse (“The Group of 20 has completely failed to do
what is necessary to rein in global megabanks — and to make them safer.”); Anat Admati,
Healthy Banking System is the Goal, Not Profitable Banks, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2010,
http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/research/admatiFTletter11.09.10.pdf (“Basel III bank
regulation proposals that Group of 20 leaders will discuss fail to eliminate key structural
flaws in the current system.”); Stiglitz Criticizes Multiple Shortcomings of the G20 Agenda,
INT’L
FIN.
INST.
IN
LATIN
AMERICA,
Sep.
29,
2009,
http://ifis.choike.org/informes/1111.html (“The fact that the G20 allocated its funds almost
entirely to the IMF means in part that the world does not yet have the right kind of
institutions for effective crisis response”); Anders Aslung, The Group of 20 Must be
Stopped, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/37deaeb4-dad0-11de933d-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz1PU5zsLUi (“[T]he G20 actually violates fundamental
principles of international co-operation by arrogating for itself important financial
decisions that should be shared by all countries. In so doing it also emasculates the
sovereign rights of small countries that have long been the prime defenders of
multilateralism and international law as well as the foremost policy innovators.”); Hans
Debowski,
Criticism
of
g20
Crisis
Management,
D+C,
Feb.
2009,
http://www.inwent.org/ez/articles/087261/index.en.shtml (“Robert Zoellick, the president
of the World Bank, bemoaned that, instead of safeguarding free trade as promised in
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Therefore, while the G20 still proceeds to administer a host of networks as
they develop norms and often gel into legal standards, the kind of political
impetus characterizing the G20’s initial success appears to wane. As long as
the G20 remains a political, and indeed diplomatic, entity as an “Executive
Coordinator” amongst different networks,153 the G2o might have to live
with the disappointment derived from a mismatch between professionalism
and politics.
B. Networks at Play
The G20’s coordinated response to the global financial crisis
provides a rich opportunity to analyze sophisticated network dynamics.
Like-minded regulators from different governments in sector specific TRNs
display these dynamics while working towards goals set by the G20. At the
same time, since any TRN may contain more than one sub-network, such as
the BCBS as a sub-network in the Banking Network, the G20’s
coordination efforts within each network are vital. As discussed above, the
evolution of the G20 into a premier international economic forum tracks the
increasing manifestation of its coordination efforts to guide, facilitate and
even balance these intra-network dynamics.
1. The Banking Network
The most prominent TRN that the G20’s Leader Summit coordinates
is the Banking Network. The G20 mobilized the pre-existing banking
networks already operating at the FSB, the IMF and the BCBS. The G20
linked them altogether to build a larger, more capable TRN. It then directed
the network’s activities in the financial crisis of 2008.
The G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors formally
established the Banking Network in 1999 at its ministerial. While the
ministerial involves finance ministers and central bank governors, lower
level officials meet prior to ministerial to begin negotiations, work on
logistics and technical matters.154 Much work goes on prior to ministerial
meetings including “two deputies meetings each year as well as extensive
technical work, including an array of workshops, reports and case studies on

November, some G20 members had taken protectionist steps. . . .”).
153
Claire R. Kelly, Financial Crises and Civil Society, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 505 (2011);
see also Alexandroff & Kirton, supra note 95, at 193 (referring to the group as an “implicit
global executive committee.”).
154
NELSON, supra note 88, at 7.
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specific subjects.”155 There are also meetings amongst “sherpas,” who are
the personal representatives of the ministers and they meet both prior to and
following the summits to attend to the details of the proposals for and the
conclusions of the summits.
The FSB, while part of the Banking Network could be considered a
core coordinator amongst various financial networks within the G20,
including the securities and insurance networks, but especially within the
banking network. In the 2008 crisis the G20 instructed the FSB to take
charge of the coordination of exit strategies,156 as well as surveillance.157
The Banking Network also encompasses the World Bank158 and the IMF, as
both institutions employ the networks of national finance ministers and

155

Id.
MICHAEL CROWLEY, THE PEW ECONOMIC POLICY DEPARTMENT, G-20
BACKGROUND NOTE 4 (2009), http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/policy%20page/G-20-NoteFinal.pdf.
157
LONDON AND WASHINGTON PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 129, at ¶ 33. The
membership of the FSB is all G-20 countries, the former Financial Stability Forum (FSF)
members, Spain and the European Commission. The FSF preceded the FSB and was itself
preceded by the “Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates.” SLAUGHTER, supra note 2, at
135. The actual members are the central bank governors and finance ministers from
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India,
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of
America.
Financial
Stability
Board,
Links
to
FSB
Members,
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/members/links.htm (last visited Jul. 17, 2011). Also,
the following organizations take part in the operation of the FSB: IOSCO, the Basel
Committee, the Bank for International Settlements, the European Central Bank, the
European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, the Organisation for Economic
Co-ordination and Development, the World Bank, the Committee on the Global Financial
System, the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, the International Association
of Insurance Supervisors, and the International Accounting Standards Board.
158
The World Bank consists of five institutions: The International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (“IBRD”), the International Development Association
(IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency (MIGA), and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID). For a complete description of these five institutions see THE WORLD BANK, A
GUIDE TO THE WORLD BANK 10–23 (2003). It provides loans to developing countries
fostering economic and social development. Articles of Agreement of the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, July 22, 1944, Art. I, § (i), 60 Stat. 1440, 2
U.N.T.S. 134, amended 16 U.S.T. 1942, 606 U.N.T.S. 294.; Articles of Agreement of the
International Development Association, Preamble, 11 U.S.T. 2284, 439 U.N.T.S. 249
(entered into force Sept. 24, 1960). See The World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org
(follow “About” hyperlink; then follow “Articles of Agreement” hyperlink under “Key
Resources”) (last visited Jul. 17, 2011). Member countries fund it through the purchase of
capital stock.
156
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central bankers.159 The World Bank funds various projects in developing
countries, such as “education, health, public administration, infrastructure,
financial and private sector development, agriculture and environmental and
natural resource management.”160 It also enforces certain principles and
standards by conditioning the provision of those resources on the
implementation of those principles and standards.161
The IMF carries out the G20’s action plans in the area of banking
regulation mainly due to its expertise. The IMF facilitates global monetary
cooperation using three tools:162 economic surveillance, technical
assistance, and lending.163 First, the IMF monitors the economic health of
member countries, alerting them to potential risks. Through its system of
“bilateral surveillance,”164 it annually evaluates all 186 of its member
countries and then discusses with that country “whether there are risks to
the economy’s domestic and external stability that would argue for
adjustments in economic or financial policies.”165 It may also engage in
multilateral consultations involving global stability issues.166 Its technical
assistance focuses on a variety of topics including “fiscal policy, monetary
and exchange rate policies, banking and financial system supervision and
regulation, and statistics.”167 It also lends to countries in financial crisis.
For example, the IMF recently loaned the Ukraine 16 billion dollars to aid
its banking industry.168 It has also coordinated with the FSB to explore gaps
159

Anne Marie Slaughter points out that their weighted voted mechanisms elevate
them somewhat as a distinct entity rather than merely a forum for a network. SLAUGHTER,
supra note 2, at 22.
160
The World Bank, About Us, See The World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org
(follow “About” hyperlink) (last visited Jul. 17, 2011).
161
See Stiglitz, supra note 152, at 75.
162
See
International
Monetary
Fund
(IMF),
Our
Work,
http://www.imf.org/external/about/ourwork.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2010).
163
Carlo Gola & Francesco Spadafora , Financial Sector Surveillance and the IMF 3
(Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 247 2009), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09247.pdf.
164
Id.; see also IMF, THE 2007 SURVEILLANCE DECISION: REVISED OPERATIONAL
GUIDANCE 9 (2009), http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/062209.pdf.
165
IMF, How We Do It, http://www.imf.org/external/about/howwedo.htm (last visited
Mar. 24, 2010).
166
David Robinson, IMF-Backed Plan to Cut Global Imbalances, IMF, Aug. 7, 2007,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2007/SurveyartA.htm.
167
IMF, How we do it, supra note 165.
168
IMF To Loan Ukraine Billions To Cope With Global Crisis, RADIO FREE EUR.
RADIO
LIBERTY,
Mar.
24,
2010,
http://www.rferl.org/Content/IMF_To_Loan_Ukraine_Billions_To_Cope_With_Global
_Crisis/1335307.html; Press Release, IMF, IMF Completes Second Review Under StandBy Arrangement with Ukraine and Approves US$3.3 Billion Disbursement (Jul. 28, 2009).
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in data collection at the direction of the G20.169
Another crucial pillar of the Banking Network is the BCBS
comprised of the central bank governors from 27 countries.170 Housed in the
Bank for International Settlements, the BCBS “generates global public
goods of information and expertise”171 in the area of banking supervision. It
drafts a variety of technical regulatory prototypes relating to capital
adequacy and liquidity requirements of banks.172 These regulatory
prototypes, while non-binding in a formal legal sense, are highly respected
due to the BCBS’s professional legitimacy. The G20 has invoked the
BCBS’s competence and reputation and assigned several roles in its action
plans.173
The G20 has orchestrated these components of the Banking Network
to produce both frameworks and more definite regulatory prototypes in its
characteristically incremental manner. For example, in implementing the
Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth, the G20 first
tasked the IMF and the World Bank with a reporting function in the Finance
Ministers’ Meeting at St. Andrews, Scotland in November 2009.174 The
Framework specified that the IMF must analyze how countries’ “respective
169

See THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND INFORMATION GAPS, REPORT TO THE G20 FINANCE
MINISTERS
AND
CENTRAL
BANK
GOVERNORS
(2009)
http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/102909.pdf.
170
Bank for International Settlements, Basel II and Revisions to the Capital
Requirements Directive, http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100503.htm (last visited June 6,
2011) (discussing the impact, calibration, and implementation of the BCBS).
171
Michael S. Barr & Jeffrey P. Miller, Global Administration Law: The View from
Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 15, 23 (2006).
172
See Bank for International Settlements, About the Basel Committee,
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/ (last visited June 5, 2011) (noting that the BCBS develops
guidelines and supervisory standards for banks, including standards on capital adequacy).
173
See G20, DECLARATION SUMMIT ON FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE WORLD
ECONOMY (2008) http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_summit_declaration.pdf (discussing
that the BCBS “should study the need for and help develop firms’ new stress testing
models, as appropriate”); see also G20, DECLARATION ON STRENGTHENING THE FINANCIAL
SYSTEM—LONDON
(2009)
http://www.g20.org/Documents/Fin_Deps_Fin_Reg_Annex_020409_-_1615_final.pdf
(discussing the role of the BCBS in compensation and its position to strengthen
international cooperation and international frameworks for prudential regulation); see also
LEADERS’ STATEMENT THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT, supra note 99 (highlighting a way to
strengthen the international financial regulatory system by building high quality capital and
mitigating pro-cyclicality).
174
G-20, COMMUNIQUÉ: MEETING OF FINANCE MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK
GOVERNORS, ¶ 3 (2010) http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20finance100423.html. It has
also partnered in the G-20 Pittsburgh summit commitment to reduce fossil fuel energy
subsidies. See LEADERS’ STATEMENT THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT, supra note 99.

PLEASE DO NOT DISTRIBUTE OR QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR

40

NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

[9-Aug-11

national or regional policy frameworks fit together.”175 The World Bank
had been asked to report of development and poverty reduction.176 The
Framework also initiated a new “mutual assessment” process and
constructed a detailed timetable for its operation.177 Subsequently at the
Leaders Meeting in Toronto, Canada in June of 2010, G20 reviewed the
policy proposal prepared by the IMF and moved forward on a consultative
mutual assessment process. As part of this process they developed a basket
of policy options to achieve stronger, more sustainable and more balanced
growth.”178 Of course, the G20’s executive coordination reaches beyond
the blueprint level: it also generates more concrete regulatory prototypes,
such as the Basel III.
The development of Basel III eloquently demonstrates how the G20
coordinated the banking network to produce a regulatory prototype. The
G20 Summit in Washington DC in November 2008 issued the “Washington
Action Plan.” In the Plan, G20 leaders instructed the IMF and the expanded
FSF to develop “recommendations,” which would eventually evolve into a
new regulatory prototype on bank capital.179 Upon the instruction, the FSF
and its members immediately focused on the bank capital adequacy ratio.
The G20 Leaders also agreed that the BCBS would provide new guidelines
for harmonized capital requirements by the end of 2009.180
Admittedly, the BCBS’s role in capital adequacy started long before
the 2008 crisis. To understand the role of capital adequacy standards one
must remember that when a highly leveraged firm suffers a loss, creditors
tend to withdraw funding which might require the firm to sell off assets
which may precipitate further losses.181 If other firms are counterparties or
hold similar assets, a more systemic risk arises and capital dries up.
Regulators who prefer greater capital requirements see these capital
requirements as buffers against such loses that might precipitate a crisis.
Prior to the 2008 crisis the BCBS has developed Basel I and Basel
II. Both Basel I and Basel II provided capital buffers, yet failed to prevent
the 2008 crisis. 182 Some have suggested that the failure of Basel I and Basel
175

LEADERS’ STATEMENT THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT, supra note 99.
Id.
177
Id.
178
TORONTO SUMMIT DECLARATION, supra note 99.
179
G-20, PROGRESS REPORT ON THE ACTIONS OF THE WASHINGTON ACTION PLAN
(2009), http://www.g20.org/Documents/FINAL_Annex_on_Action_Plan.pdf [hereinafter
WASHINGTON ACTION PLAN].
180
Id.
181
REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE
OF GLOBAL FINANCE 143 (Viral A. Acharya, et al. eds., 2011).
182
Id.
176
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II can be traced to the fact that in each the needed buffer was tied to an
individual firm and not the systemic relationship amongst firms. 183
Moreover, a buffer, which some would suggest only provides a second best
solution, might be either too costly or ineffective.184 The first best solution
they would argue is to internalize the cost of risk.185 Basel III, arguably
merely tinkers with the model established in Basel I and Basel II. It does
not internalize the cost of risk, and indeed some would contend that Basel
III encourages firms to avoid its strictures by seeking a shadow banking
regime, which tends to create risk. 186 Thus, at first glance Basel III
appears to be one of the failings of intra-network dynamics. The process
can be insular and limiting. The virtue of empathetic sympathization that
brings network actors together also may stop them from taking a step back
to see the failures of their actions. If one starts with a failed product the
outgrowth of future intra-network dynamics will arguably be more failure.
Thus, the network dynamics involved in Basel III might lead to more, not
less, failure (if one views of Basel I and Basel II as flawed products).
Apart from the controversial merits, or demerits, of Basel III, it is
still worth examining the developments leading to Basel III to fully evaluate
the G20’s coordination efforts as well as the intra-network dynamism. The
BCBS’s goal for Basel III was to better hedge against systemic loses by
183

Id.
WSBI-ESBC, POSITION REGARDING THE BASEL CONSULTATION ON A
‘COUNTERCYCLICAL
CAPITAL
BUFFER
PROPOSAL,’
6–7
(2010)
http://www.wsbi.org/uploadedFiles/Position_papers/0992-WSBIESBG%20Position%20regarding%20the%20Basel%20consultation%20on%20a%20%E2
%80%9CCountercyclical%20buffer%20proposal%E2%80%9D%20_BCBS%20172_.pdf
(“An inappropriate level of regulatory requirements (i.e. too low or too high capital
buffers) might prove to be either inefficient or excessively expensive”; “Because capital is
costly and because investors in times of crisis are looking for secure investments, we
believe that there is a risk that the proposed buffers would turn into a set of new minimum
requirements thereby missing the initial objective.”); BUILDING SOC’Y ASS’N, OUR
RESPONSE TO TWO BASEL COMMITTEE CONSULTATIONS: STRENGTHENING THE RESILIENCE
OF THE BANKING SECTOR (CP 164) AND INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR LIQUIDITY RISK
MEASUREMENT,
STANDARDS
AND
MONITORING
(CP165)
5
(2010),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs165/tbsa.pdf (“Another unintended consequence of too costly
liquidity requirements will be to push banks into higher risk business to compensate for
holding low margin, or unprofitable assets, clearly not the intention of the proposed
rules.”); BUILDING SOC’Y ASS’N, Independent Commission on Banking: Call for Evidence
2
(2010),
http://bankingcommission.independent.gov.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2011/01/Building-Society-Association-Issues-Paper-Response.pdf
(“Overall, the Commission must decide what it is trying to optimize, or whether some sort
of second best solution, for example relying on capital buffers, is sufficient.”).
185
Regulating Wall Street, supra note 181, at 153.
186
Id. at 144.
184
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providing for greater capital requirements, enhanced liquidity, and
countercyclical buffers.187 Still, disagreements arose over what was meant
by capital and how stringent the requirements needed to be.188 The G20
prodded the BCBS along. By the Pittsburgh Summit in September 2009,
the G20 members agreed that a major form of Tier 1 capital must be
“common shares and retained earnings.”189 They also agreed to develop
separate rules for “non-joint stock companies” so that these companies
could hold equivalent levels of high quality Tier 1 capital. The G20 then
instructed the BCBS to issue concrete proposals by the end of 2009,
conduct an impact assessment at the beginning of 2010 and complete the
task by the end of 2010.
The making of the new bank capital requirements intensified after
the G20 Pittsburgh Summit. By the G20 Toronto Meeting in June 2010, the
BCBS had undertaken a comprehensive “bottom-up” quantitative impact
assessment as well as a detailed “top-down” macroeconomic impact
assessment on the bank capital requirements.190 Meanwhile, the guidelines
for bank capital harmonization took solid shape: a considerably higher share
of Tier 1 capital had to be “common equity”; the rest of Tier 1 capital base
had to include those instruments “that are subordinated, have fully
discretionary non-cumulative dividends or coupons and neither have a
maturity date nor an incentive to redeem”; any “innovative hybrid capital
instruments” had to be phased out; Tier 2 capital base had to be
harmonized; Tier 3 capital instruments to cover market risks had to be
eliminated. In September 2010, the BCBS finally announced its new
capital requirements, Basel III, which established a 7% of a minimum
187

BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS, (2010),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf (discussing erosion of quality of capital which led to
2007 financial crisis and listing Basel Committee’s goals for Basel III).
188
IFAM Group, Basel III, http://www.ifamgroup.com/basel-iii/ (last visited Jul. 15,
2011) (”[T]he industry argues that the committee is going overboard in many areas and
doing so in ways that will significantly, and unnecessarily, raise the cost of providing loans
and other banking services. . .Banks in every country gain considerable benefit from at
least one of the balance sheet items that will no longer count as capital and therefore put
forth arguments as to why they should continue to count. . . .”).
189
G20, PROGRESS REPORT ON THE ACTIONS TO PROMOTE FINANCIAL REGULATORY
REFORM ISSUED BY THE U.S. CHAIR OF THE PITTSBURG G-20 SUMMIT (2009),
http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh_progress_report_250909.pdf.
190
G20, PROGRESS REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ACTIONS OF THE
LONDON, WASHINGTON AND PITTSBURGH G20 SUMMITS PREPARED BY KOREA, CHAIR OF
THE
G20
(2010),
http://www.g20.org/Documents2010/07/July_2010_G20_Progress_Grid.pdf
[hereinafter
PROGRESS REPORT ON THE PREVIOUS SUMMITS].
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common equity requirement as well as an additional counter-cyclical buffer
including up to 2.5% of risk-weighted assets. The G20 members endorsed
the Basel III at the Seoul Summit in November 2010. Notably at the same
time the G20 leaders and the banking network encouraged States to
implement Basel II.191
Basel III required several points of position-shifting and
reconciliation where we could expect to see intra-network dynamics at
work. First, reports indicate that German and French officials led concerns
that the Basel III standards would be too stringent and require
implementation too quickly.192 One proposal attributed to the US and the
UK was to compromise of the scope of the standards by tinkering with the
definition of “capital,” to specifically exclude minority interests of financial
institutions held by banks.193 Indeed, some saw the willingness of the US
and UK to be persuaded as evidence of their belief in the global approach
and the legitimacy that had been invested in it. 194 Further, while the Basel
III timetable has been criticized as too long, some have pointed to the need
to compromise on this issue due to the state of the recovery in some
countries as well as the need to restructure on behalf of some (particularly
European) banks given the new capital definitions.195 Some issues, such as
whether and how to recognize new capital instruments,196 and the
establishment of buffers,197 remained unresolved. These unresolved issues
represent the limit of G20’s coordination, at least at this moment.198
191

Letter from Michel Pébereau & Clemens Börsig, members of European Financial
Services Round Table, to Christine Lagarde, Minister of Finance in France (Feb. 16, 2011)
(available
at
http://www.efr.be/documents/news/75.2011.02.%20EFR%20Letter%20to%20G20%20Fin
ance%20Minister%20Lagarde%2016.02.2011.pdf) (urging G20 Commitment to implement
Basel II and III); see also THE SEOUL SUMMIT DECLARATION, supra note 99.
192
Yalman Onaran & Simon Clark, European Banks Poised to Win Reprieve in Basel
on Capital Rules, BLOOMBERG, Jul. 12, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-0516/geithner-meeting-barnier-over-basel-iii-creates-pressure-on-banks-capital.html.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Basel III Standards for Banks’ Capital and Liquidity is on Track, GLG RESEARCH,
Oct. 9, 2010, http://www.glgroup.com/News/Basel-III-standards-for-banks-capital-andliquidity-is-on-track-50915.html.
196
Id. See also BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PROPOSAL TO ENSURE
THE LOSS ABSORBENCY OF REGULATORY CAPITAL AT THE POINT OF NON V IABILITY,
(2010) http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs174.pdf.
197
See Basel III Standards for Banks’ Capital and Liquidity is on Track, supra note
195.
198
See e.g., Wolverson, supra note 152 (“The G20 finance meeting this weekend in
Gyeongju, South Korea, failed to produce concrete measures to tame worsening trade and
currency imbalances. . . .”); Paul Krugmann, The Third Depression, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,
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At the same time, the incremental formation of Basel III also offers
an excellent avenue in locating the intra-network dynamics leading up to
this regulatory prototype created by the Banking Network. First of all, the
network collaboration in this highly professional area would not have been
possible without the widely shared, if not uniform, professional grounds
among network participants. Government officials from different countries’
Finance Ministries and Central Banks spoke the similar, if not identical,
language, similar enough to communicate with each other. They understand
what the terms “Tier I capital” and “risk capture” mean. This expert
sympathization among network participants expands any otherwise local
regulatory dialogue into a multilateral horizon so that like-minded
regulators can collaborate on the eventual formulation of a regulatory
product, such as Basel III.
Admittedly, not every dialogue leads to consensus or convergence.
There may be disagreements on a number of issues at a professional level.
To narrow the gap of these disagreements among them, some participants
attempt to “persuade” other members to accept their positions. When this
attempt to persuade occurs simultaneously from both directions, two parties
engage in a “negotiation.” In the Banking Network, Franco-German
regulators persuaded the U.S. and UK counterparts to exclude minority
interests of financial institutions held by banks from the definition of
“capital.” In return, the U.S. and the UK regulators could persuade their
European counterparts to accept Basel III despite the latter’s concern for
implementation due to the new capital definition.199
Unsurprisingly, developing countries played a relatively small role,
if at all, in the establishment of Basel III mainly due to their limited
influence in this area. Nonetheless, they decided to remain engaged to
preserve their actor momentum in the network. This is a good example of
2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/28/opinion/28krugman.html?scp=7&sq=g20%20failure
&st=cse (“[M]ost recently at last weekend’s deeply discouraging G-20 meeting—
governments are obsessing about inflation when the real threat is deflation, preaching the
need for belt-tightening when the real problem is inadequate spending.”); Simon Johnson,
Capital
Failure,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Nov.
11,
2010,
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/11/capitalfailure/?scp=1&sq=g20%20failure&st=cse (“The Group of 20 has completely failed to do
what is necessary to rein in global megabanks—and to make them safer.”); Admati, supra
note 152 (“Basel III bank regulation proposals that Group of 20 leaders will discuss fail to
eliminate key structural flaws in the current system.”).
199
See Elena Logutenkova & Fabio Benedetti-Valentini, BNP Grows to Biggest Bank
as France Says Size Doesn’t Matter, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 4, 2010,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-03/bnp-grows-to-biggest-bank-as-france-sayssize-doesn-t-matter.html.
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willing marginalization.
Finally, most participants engaged in deliberation on Basel III
despite the fact that they could not resolve all the issues on the table. Some
issues remain unresolved. Nonetheless, network participants understood the
incremental nature of this network operation and could hammer out a
modest yet still desirable outcome. The G20 network process over the Basel
III typifies “responsive engagement” in that it signifies that the network
participants are still willing to negotiate, at least on some issues, even if
they may fail to conclude on others at present. Such responsive engagement
is vital in preserving momentum in regulatory dialogue regardless of any
immediate regulatory end product. In sum, their understanding of
responsive engagement enabled the network operation to move forward.
Possibly, these same participants may produce Basel IV or V later on as
their networking continues.
In sum, to deliver a new regulatory prototype (such as the Basel III)
the G20 choreographed various component networks, such as the IMF and
the BCBS, in a way which the TRN could be geared toward a collective
goal. Here, the G20, as an executive coordinator, was able to mobilize its
unique political capital in orchestrating these components, generate various
regulatory prototypes, and eventually confirm them. At the same time,
however, due to a largely self-referential nature of intra-network dynamics
the Banking Network operation may still be insular and unresponsive to
external debates or criticisms on the merits of its regulatory products such
as Basel III.
2. Securities Network
The G20 makes use of IOSCO, a broad and active network of
securities regulators.200 It develops and promotes “consistent standards of
regulation, oversight and enforcement in order to protect investors, maintain
200

See International Organization of Securities Commissions, http://www.iosco.org
(last visited Jan. 10, 2011). Currently IOSCO has 199 members: 114 ordinary members, 11
associate members, and 74 affiliate members. IOSCO: Membership and Committees List,
http://www.iosco.org/lists/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2011). It has three categories of
membership: ordinary, associate, and affiliate. See id. Ordinary membership is open to
primary national securities regulators. About IOSCO: Membership Categories and Criteria,
http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=membership (last visited Jan. 10, 2011). As
ordinary members, national securities regulators each have one vote in the Presidents
Committee’s Annual Conference. Id. Associate members are other securities and or futures
regulators in a jurisdiction. Id. Associate members have no vote and are not eligible for the
Executive Committee; however, they are members of the Presidents’ Committee. Id.
Affiliate members are self-regulatory bodies, which are not members of President’s
Committee, without a vote or eligibility for the Executive Committee. Id.
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fair, efficient and transparent markets, and seek to address systemic
risks.”201 It operates through several committees, the most important of
which is the Technical Committee.202
Over the years IOSCO has developed a number of important
standards and best practices: accounting standards;203 core standards to
facilitate cross-border offerings and listings;204 global investment
performance standards;205 auditing standards;206 disclosure standards to
facilitate cross-border offerings and listings by multinational issuers;207 and
international standards for central counterparty clearing organizations.208
These standards and best practices are widely adopted by the leading
financial regulators and, as a result, followed by transnational firms.209
IOSCO’s engagement with the G20’s crisis management began with
IOSCO sending an open letter to the G20, applauding its efforts to deal with
the crisis and offering assistance.210 Its Technical Committee created a task
force to support the G20’s efforts.211 It undertook a number of tasks in
201

About IOSCO: General Information, http://www.iosco.org/about (last visited Jan.
10, 2011).
202
The Technical Committee’s work covers Multinational Disclosure and Accounting,
Regulation of Secondary Markets, Regulation of Market Intermediaries, Enforcement and
the Exchange of Information, Investment Management, and Credit Rating Agencies. About
IOSCO:
Working
Committees,
http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=workingcmts (last visited Jul. 17, 2011).
203
Press Release, IOSCO, IOSCO Technical Committee Statement on Accounting
Standards Development and Enforcement (Oct. 21, 2008) (available at
http://www.iasplus.com/iosco/0810techcommittee.pdf).
204
TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SECURITIES COMM’NS, IASC
STANDARDS:
ASSESSMENT
REPORT
4
(2000),
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD109.pdf.
205
EMERGING MARKETS COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMMISSIONS,
PERFORMANCE PRESENTATION STANDARDS FOR COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT SCHEMES 2
(Dec. 2000), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD114.pdf.
206
Press Release, IOSCO, IOSCO Statement on International Auditing Standards
(Nov. 9, 2007), (available at http://www.iasplus.com/iosco/0711isastatement.pdf).
207
INT’L ORG. OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, A RESOLUTION OF THE PRESIDENTS’
COMMITTEE ON IOSCO ENDORSEMENT OF DISCLOSURE STANDARDS TO FACILITATE
CROSS-BORDER OFFERINGS AND LISTINGS BY MULTINATIONAL ISSUERS
(1998),
http://www.iosco.org/library/resolutions/pdf/IOSCORES17.pdf.
208
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS & INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMMISSIONS,
RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR
CENTRAL
COUNTERPARTIES
2
(2004),
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD176.pdf.
209
Press Release, IOSCO, IOSCO Publishes Regulatory Standards for Funds of Hedge
Funds
(Sept.
14,
2009)
(available
at
http://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS166.pdf).
210
Open
Letter
to
the
G20,
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD282.pdf (last visited Jul. 21, 2011).
211
Press Release, IOSCO, IOSCO Technical Committee Launches Task Force to
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connection with the G20’s efforts including its collaboration with the BCBS
and the IAIS as part of a Joint Forum resulting in the report on the
Differentiated Nature and Scope of Financial Regulation.212
Most illustrative for our purposes though is IOSCO’s engagement in
the regulation of “credit rating agencies (CRAs),” both before and during
the 2008 financial crisis, which reveals the use of intra-network dynamics
over a period of time. IOSCO’s focus on CRAs emerged after the East
Asian Financial Crisis and again after the failures of WorldCom and Enron
in 2002. While a high credit rating never meant that something was a good
investment (ratings indicate only “the likelihood that a particular debt
security will perform according to its terms”),213 the extent to which
regulators such as the SEC or the Banking network in Basel II referenced
credit ratings tended to infuse them with credibility.214 As is widely known
now, this veneer of credibility created problems because there were real
gaps in CRAs regulation long before the most recent crisis.215
The IOSCO Technical Committee targeted the CRA gap starting in

Support
G-20
Aims
(Nov.
25,
2008)
(available
at
http://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS134.pdf).
212
Containing core principles as well as cross sectoral standards to avoid systemic risk
and regulatory arbitrage. PROGRESS REPORT ON THE PREVIOUS SUMMITS, supra note 190,
at ¶63. The report focused on underwriting standards as well as hedge fund activities. Each
of the networks involved, including IOSCO were tasked with developing principles to
respond to regulatory deficits while the FSB oversaw policy implementation. IOSCO for
example in June 2010 issued its “revised Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation
to incorporate eight new principles.” PROGRESS REPORT ON THE PREVIOUS SUMMITS, supra
note 190, at ¶¶63 The resulting report illustrates the long-standing collaboration of IOSCO
with Basel Committee as well as the IAIS over many years. The report relied on numerous
prior reports and studies including Supervision of Financial Conglomerates (February
1999), Core Principles: Cross-sectoral Comparison (November 2001), Risk Management
Practices and Regulatory Capital: Cross-sectoral Comparison (November 2001), Credit
Risk Transfer (March 2005), Regulatory and Market Differences: Issues and Observations
(May 2006), Customer Suitability in the Retail Sale of Financial Products and Services
(April 2008), Credit Risk Transfer: Developments from 2005 to 2007 (July 2008),
Stocktaking on the Use of Credit Ratings (June 2009), and Report on Special Purposes
Entities (September 2009). The conclusions and recommendations are based upon this
prior work of each of the networks working independently as well as the three working
together through the Joint Forum.
213
Karmel & Kelly, supra note 78, at 924–25; see also STANDARD & POOR’S, GUIDE
TO
CREDIT
RATING
ESSENTIALS
3–4
(2010),
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/SP_CreditRatingsGuide.pdf.
214
Karmel & Kelly, supra note 78, at 925.
215
See, e.g., id. at 925 (“The failure of the CRAs to promptly adjust ratings or forecast
the demise of issuers that went bankrupt when the stock market technology bubble burst
then led to scrutiny of their performance and the lack of government regulation.”).
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2003 with a Report of the Activities of Credit Rating Agencies. 216 IOSCO
also published a set of Principles Regarding the Activities of CRAs in 2003.
217
But critics questioned the sufficiency of these principles to address
CRAs problems stemming from Basel II’s use of the ratings. 218 IOSCO
responded with a Code of Conduct Fundamentals for CRAs offering greater
specificity with respect to such issues as conflicts of interest, independence,
and transparency. 219 Interestingly, the rating agencies themselves got into
the act, developing their own Code of Professional Conduct in the second
half of 2005. Indeed, IOSCO’s March 2009 Report Assessing CRAs found
that many of them had adopted Codes of Conduct that reflected IOSCO’s
Code of Conduct Fundamentals.220
Prior to the most recent crisis, the United States Congress addressed
perceived deficiencies in the CRA system in 2006. Following the IOSCO’s
Code of Conduct for CRAs, Congress passed the Credit Agency Reform
Act of 2006 “which established a system of registration and regulation of
[CRAs] and instructed the SEC to formulate implementing rules.” 221
Among other things this act established a system of non-mandatory
registration and imposed substantive requirements with respect to conflicts
of interest, public information and anticompetitive practices. 222 The SEC
passed implementing rules. Among other things the rules “prohibit credit
raters from rating their own work, and ban employees who help determine a
credit rating from negotiating any fees.” 223
Although IOSCO’s CRA prototype had hardened into law in the US,
IOSCO continued elaborating its standards. It updated its Code of Conduct
216

THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMMISSIONS, REPORT ON
ACTIVITIES
OF
CREDIT
RATING
AGENCIES
(2003),
http://www.fsa.go.jp/inter/ios/20030930/05.pdf.
217
THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMMISSIONS, IOSCO
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES REGARDING THE ACTIVITIES OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
(2003), http://www.fsa.go.jp/inter/ios/20030930/02.pdf.
218
Karmel & Kelly, supra note 78, at 927.
219
THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMMISSIONS, CODE OF
CONDUCT FUNDAMENTAL FOR CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (2004, revised May 2008),
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD180.pdf.
220
PROGRESS REPORT ON THE PREVIOUS SUMMITS, supra note 190, at ¶¶ 97. [?]
221
Kelly & Karmel, supra note 78, at 927. See also Credit Rating Agency Reform Act
of 2006, 109 P.L. 291, 120 Stat. 1327 (2006) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7
(2010)).
222
Global Legal Information Network, Credit Agency Reform Act of 2006,
http://www.glin.gov/view.action?glinID=190699 (last visited June 12, 2011) (summarizing
the Act, including registration system and requirements).
223
EU Lawmakers Back Strict Rules on Credit Agencies, EURACTIV.COM, Mar. 25,
2009, http://www.euractiv.com/en/financial-services/eu-lawmakers-back-strict-rules-creditagencies/article-180606.
THE
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and issued a Consultation Report. 224 But critics persisted. In 2008, EU
Commissioner Charles McCreevy called IOSCO’s efforts toothless. 225
The EU pushed for and developed stricter standards for the regulation of
CRAs, the strictest of any jurisdiction. 226 The EU Parliament initially put
the Committee of European Securities Regulators (“CESR”) at the center of
a CRA registration system that included monitoring and implementation.
The substantive provisions called for a review of business models and a
decrease in the use of ratings by regulators. 227 The US balked at the
extraterritorial application of the EU regulations.228
Once the 2008 crisis emerged we saw the G20 attempt to coordinate
regulatory outcomes. Starting with the very first summit, the G20 called
upon national regulators to improve CRA oversight. Previously, the US had
pressed for greater cooperation, while the EU seemed committed to tougher
regulation.229 The G20, through the FSB, has asked the U.S. and EU to
resolve significant inconsistencies among their CRA regulations. 230 The
FSB also urged G20 countries to reduce the use of ratings as the dominant
224

See THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMMISSIONS, FINAL
REPORT: THE ROLE OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN STRUCTURED FINANCE MARKETS
(2008), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD270.pdf.
225
Gillian Tett, Unease as Regulators Call for More Control Over Ratings System,
FINANCIAL TIMES, June 25, 2008, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c0ee5928-424e-11dda5e8-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1RMNi2Bxi. It has been suggested that the EU wanted to
break the dominance of the US credit rating agencies. Jim Brunsden, Commission Plans to
Get Tough With Rating Agencies, EUROPEANVOICE.COM, June 3, 2010,
http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2010/06/commission-plans-to-get-tough-withrating-agencies/68104.aspx.
226
Douglas W. Arner et al., Central Banks and Central Bank Cooperation in the
Global Financial System, 23 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 380 (2010);
see also Reforming the Ratings Agencies: Will the U.S. Follow Europe’s Tougher Rules?,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON,
May
27,
2009,
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2242.
227
The rules further provide the CRAs:
“•May not provide advisory services.
•Must disclose the models, methodologies and key assumptions upon which
ratings are based.
•Must differentiate the ratings of complex products with a specific symbol.
•Must publish an annual transparency report.
•Must have at least two directors on their boards whose salary does not
depend on the ratings agency's business performance.
•Must create an internal function to review the quality of their ratings.” Id.
228
EU Lawmakers Back Strict Rules on Credit Agencies, supra note _.
229
Kristina St. Charles, Note, Regulating Imperialism: The Worldwide Export of
European Regulatory Principles on Credit Rating Agencies, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 399
(2010) (discussing EU’s stricter CRA regulations and the differences from US regulations).
230
PROGRESS REPORT ON THE PREVIOUS SUMMITS, supra note 190, at ¶¶ 93–95.
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means of assessing risk. Adhering to the FSB’s call, the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act eliminated references to credit
ratings in several statutes and the EU is considering similar measures.231 As
a related matter, the BCBS has also been asked to address reducing the “use
of external ratings in the regulatory capital framework.”232 Likewise, the
FSB manages data of for the use of ratings with an eye towards developing
principles to minimize their use. 233 The FSB committed itself to
harmonizing CRA regulatory standards in this area.234
Throughout the crisis, the G20’s coordinated work on CRAs
continued. It reiterated its calls for improved regulatory oversight at the
London, Pittsburg and Toronto Summits.235 At the Seoul Summit the G20
approved Basel III’s recommendation to reduce reliance on CRAs.236
IOSCO responded to this G20 goal with its May 2010 Principles Regarding
Cross-border Supervisory Cooperation,237 IOSCO has monitored CRAs
adoption of codes of conduct consistent with IOSCO’s Code of Conduct
Fundamentals for CRAs, finding that more CRAs are adopting the IOSCO
standards.238 IOSCO is also monitoring the supervisory initiative of various
jurisdictions in light of IOSCO CRA Principles. 239
Despite the G20 coordination, the network dynamics seem to have
had limited success in moving the key players towards regulatory
convergence. Some convergence has occurred. CRAs were originally
unregulated.240 The US started to move towards regulation after Enron in
2002 culminating in the 2006 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act.241 In the
231

Id. See also Kevin Drawbaugh, Global Regulators Urge Credit Rating Agency
available
at
Curbs,
REUTERS,
Oct.
27,
2010,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/28/financial-regulation-credit-ratersidCNN2728165520101028.
232
PROGRESS REPORT ON THE PREVIOUS SUMMITS, supra note 190, at ¶¶ 93–95.
233
Id.
234
Arner et al., supra note 226, at 40.
235
See id. (discussing G20 and Washington Action Plan).
236
Nagesh Narayana, G20 Agrees on Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings, INT’L BUS.
TIMES, Nov. 11, 2010, http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/80745/20101111/basel-3-cra-bisratings.htm.
237
PROGRESS REPORT ON THE PREVIOUS SUMMITS, supra note 190, at ¶ 46.
238
Id. at 93–95.
239
Id.
240
Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43 (2004)
(explaining that the designation of a CRA by the SEC for example (though the use of a no
action letter) merely meant that the CRA or Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organization (NRSRO) was one that was accepted by the market place as a “recognized
rating agency).
241
Id. (explaining the rules centered around disclosure and prohibited the SEC from
regulating the substance of the CRA’s ratings. The SEC followed up with rules focusing on
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EU, CRAs were likewise unregulated at first. In 2008, the EU decided to
take a tough approach to CRA regulation, tougher then both IOSCO and the
US. Therefore, one might observe that even before the onset of the financial
crisis the expert community saw the necessity of regulating CRAs.
However, the resulting mixture of EU, US, and IOSCO regulatory standards
betrays scarcity of the intra-network dynamics, in particular vis-à-vis the
Banking Network, as well as the difficulty of executive coordination by the
G20.
The problem of conflicts of interests, which plagues the industry, is
a case in point. Serious conflicts arose in the industry because issuers chose
and paid the CRAs they used. A CRA that wanted business would be better
off if it tended to give favorable ratings. Initially, this was not a big
problem. As each CRA had an interest in preserving its professional
reputation, it would not be advantageous for a CRA to risk its reputation
when there was a sufficient supply of potential customers (issuers) in the
market.242 Unfortunately, when it came to mortgage-related structured
bonds, there were not as many issuers, and therefore there was the increased
threat of conflicts.243 All regulatory bodies recognize conflicts of interest
as a problem. The expert community has been persuaded by common
experience and understanding that there needs to be some external force that
counteracts this inherent conflict. However, as each jurisdiction is
developing its own course, intra-network dynamics, such as persuasion,
negotiation, responsive engagement and even strategic cooptation, appear to
be absent for the time being.
For example, the US regulation under the Dodd-Frank Act seems
weak when compared to EU efforts. While the Dodd-Frank Act prohibits
CRAs from considering sales and marketing when arriving at its rating, it
does little else to confront conflicts risks.244 Instead, it calls for a two year
study to determine the feasibility of having another entity assign structured
finance projects.245 In contrast, the EU approach requires that an issuer not
only supply information to the CRA it chooses so that the CRA can provide
the rating, the issuer must also make that information available to all CRAs,
allowing other CRAs to rate and thus creating competition.246 Another
issue affecting conflicts of interest involves providing consultancy or
record keeping reports and procedures. Following some criticism the SEC amended its rule
to address transparency and conflicts of interests issues).
242
Regulating Wall Street, supra note 181, at 448.
243
Id. at 448–449.
244
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.L. 111–203 §§
932–933, 124 Stat. 1376, 1883–84 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 78o–7, 78u–4(b)(2)).
245
See id. § 939.
246
Regulating Wall Street, supra note 181, at 460 (explaining EU regulation).
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advisory services to a rated entity or its affiliate. The EU prohibits the
provision of such services. 247
As one commentator notes, this EU
provision resembles the requirements of IOSCO’s Code of Conduct. 248 Yet
the US has failed to adopt this type of provision in its 2006 legislation. 249
While the Dodd-Frank legislation did address the issue, it simply ordered
Congress to study the issue, rather than prohibited the practice itself. 250
Notably, the G20 has not given up on the matter. Its July 2010
Progress report notes that the “at the request of the FSB, the EU, US and
Japan are continuing their discussions to resolve any significant
inconsistencies or frictions that may arise as a result of differences among
their new CRA regulations.251 At Seoul the Leaders did approve Basel III
recommendation on reducing reliance on CRAs, but implementation
remains with national jurisdictions.252
In sum, the Securities Network demonstrates a limited success, as
measured in terms of regulatory convergence, of the G20’s coordination.
While the G20 did succeed in establishing a regulatory prototype calling for
its members to duly regulate CRAs and minimize their reliance to CRAs,
the level of national implementations has not been uniform. Notably, the
relative scarcity of intra-network dynamics in this area, vis-à-vis the
Banking Network, may explain the current transatlantic gap in regulating
CRAs, such as in the area of conflicts of interest.
3. The Insurance Network
The Insurance Network resides in the IAIS, which brings together
insurance regulators and supervisors from over 140 countries.253 The IAIS
develops best practices and core principles for insurance supervisions.254
Established in 1994 as a forum to develop international insurance norms,255
247

St. Charles, supra note 229, at 433 (citing Council Regulation 1060/2009, annex I,
§ B(4)).
248
Id. at 433 (citing IOSCO, Revised Code of Conduct, § 2.5).
249
Id. (citing Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, § 4,
120 Stat. 1327 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(2)).).
250
Dodd-Frank, supra note 244, § 939C(b).
251
PROGRESS REPORT ON THE PREVIOUS SUMMITS, supra note 190, at ¶ 94.
252
See FIN. STABILITY BOARD, PRINCIPLES FOR REDUCING RELIANCE ON CRA
RATINGS, (2010) http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101027.pdf.
253
International
Association
of
Insurance
Supervisors,
Principles,
http://www.iaisweb.org/index.cfm?pageID=39 (last visited Jul. 17, 2011).
254
Id.
255
Elizabeth F. Brown, The Development of International Norms for Insurance
Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 953, 957 (2009).
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the IAIS is composed of 190 members from 140 countries.256
The
Executive Committee, the governing body of the organization, is composed
of 15 representatives from different geographical regions.257 The IAIS is
divided into three committees: a Technical Committee, an Implementation
Committee, and a Budget Committee.258 Under the Technical Committee
are various working parties responsible with drafting IAIS standards.259
The IAIS papers are intended to be implemented “in a flexible manner
depending on the circumstances within each jurisdiction.”260 The
Implementation Committee assists members by organizing training and
seminars, developing implementation tools, facilitating the provision of
technical assistance, and supporting the Financial Sector Assessment
Programme conducted by the IMF and World Bank.261
The G20 Leaders have looked to the IAIS with respect to several
issues. It has tapped the IAIS in its efforts to coordinate capital adequacy
standards.262 In response to the G20’s request in 2009 it adopted a
supervisory guidance paper on the use of supervisory colleges. It has also
adopted the Insurance Core Principles Review Process.263 As stated above,
it coordinated with the BCBS and IOSCO as part of the Joint Forum. As
stated about the IAIS collaboration with the BCBS and IOSCO in the Joint
256

The NAIC and an insurance regulator from each of the fifty-six US jurisdiction
serve as members. International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), About the
IAIS, http://www.iaisweb.org/index.cfm?pageID=28 (last visited Oct. 12, 2010). See also
Brown, supra note 255, at 963.
257
About the IAIS, supra note 256. Yoshi Kawai, Secretary General, IAIS, Remarks at
the Royal Institute of International Affairs: IAIS Standards Setting Activities 10 (Feb. 3,
2004)
(available
at
http://www.iaisweb.org/__temp/IAIS_standard_setting_activities__Speech_by_Yoshihiro_
Kawai.pdf).
258
INT’L ASS’N. OF INS. SUPERVISORS (IAIS), BY-LAWS art. 15(3) (2009),
http://www.iaisweb.org/__temp/By-laws__2009_edition_.pdf.
259
Kawai, supra note 257, at 10. After a working party drafts a document, it consults
with other IAIS members and observers, and then seeks approval from the Technical
Committee and endorsement from the Executive Committee. Id. The draft is finally
presented at an annual General Meeting where it must be approved by two-thirds of the
members. Id.
260
IAIS,
Overarching
Standard
Setting
Papers,
http://www.iaisweb.org/index.cfm?pageID=37 (last visited Oct. 23, 2010).
261
Kawai, supra note 257, at 10
262
WASHINGTON ACTION PLAN, supra note 179, at ¶ 16. “The IAIS is working to
assess issues that have emerged from the financial crisis with respect to the assessment of
the solvency of insurance companies and the group-wide solvency requirements for
internationally active insurance groups.
263
INT’L ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS: INSURANCE CORE PRINCIPLES AND
METHODOLOGY
(2003),
http://www.iaisweb.org/__temp/Insurance_core_principles_and_methodology.pdf.
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Forum preceded the 2008 financial crisis and the reports that followed the
crisis built upon that prior work.264
Finally, in response to the financial crisis and urging from the G20,
the IAIS is now “developing group-wide supervisory standards for all
insurance groups and a Common Framework for the Supervision of
Internationally Active Insurance Groups (“ComFrame”).265 A task force
chaired by a member of the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority
(FINMA) designed a work plan meant to provide qualitative and
quantitative requirements that would assist in monitoring group structures,
group business mixes and intra group transactions. 266 In January, 2010, the
Executive Committee approved the recommendations on the design and
work plan of the framework. 267 The Executive Committee will implement
the plan, by first starting with a consultative paper in 2011 followed by
implementation in 2013. 268
In the Insurance Network, as in other Networks, network dynamics
complicate the G20’s coordination efforts. The IAIS efforts, and in
particular its efforts in connection with the ComFrame has spurred US
regulatory efforts.269 ComFrame addresses holding company capital
adequacy, an issue already addressed by the EU in its regulations of insurers
270
through its Solvency II directive. Solvency II establishes a risk-based
regulatory regime,271 sets new capital adequacy and risk management
264

See
Bank
for
International
Settlements:
Joint
Forum,
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/jointforum.htm (last visited June 12, 2011). See also International
Association of Insurance Supervisors: Joint Forum, http://www.iaisweb.org/Joint-Forum49 (last visited June 12, 2011) (showcasing the reports created by the Joint Forum).
265
FIN. STABILITY BOARD, OVERVIEW OF PROGRESS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
G20 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING FINANCIAL STABILITY 5 (2010),
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_100627c.pdf
[hereinafter
STRENGTHENING FINANCIAL STABILITY].
266
Id.
267
See Press Release, IAIS, IAIS Improves Development of a Common Framework for
the Supervision of Internationall Active Insurance Groups (Jan 19, 2010) (available at
http://www.iaisweb.org/__temp/19_January_2010__IAIS_approves_development_of_a_C
ommon_Framework_for_the_Supervision_of_Internationally_Active_Insurance_Groups.p
df).
268
STRENGTHENING FINANCIAL STABILITY, supra note 265, at 5.
269
Tom Finnell, Invotex Group, Assessing the Solvency of U.S. Insurance Groups—
International Pressures Mount, http://www.invotex.com/perspectives_1010.html (last
visited Jul. 17, 2011).
270
As one commentator notes “ConFrame is poised to include requirements for
quantitative assessments by regulators of group capital.” Id.
271
Nikki Tait, EU Insurers Face Solvency II Deadlines, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2011,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/36960460-23e2-11e0-8bb100144feab49a.html#axzz1Cum99eQO.
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standards, and “aims to change investment behaviour by imposing varying
capital charges on assets.”272 A real fear exists as to whether US efforts
would pass an EU equivalency test with Solvency II. 273 US industry feels
that the EU system is too costly.274 Working through the IAIS, as well as
the EU, the US is attempting to influence the standards. Working through
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, US insurers have
tried to become part of a provisional regime which, at least for some time
will be treated as “equivalent” with the EU’s Solvency II. 275
All in all, there is wide disagreement between the EU and US
approaches, which undermines some intra-network dynamics such as
persuasion and negotiation. The back and forth between the US and EU
takes place at the same time that the IMF as instructed by the G20 is
implementing its MAP program which assesses the stability of each
country’s financial architecture including the capital adequacy standards for
insurers.276 The dynamics in this area largely remain to be seen and it will
be interesting to note how the G20’s push for the IMP to implement the
MAP influences the dynamics between the EU and the US as well as other
key players.
4. The Trade Network
It is controversial whether there exists a genuine trade network that
functions at the G20 level. As a result of the 2008 financial crisis, the G20
tapped the WTO along with the OECD and UNCTAD to monitor and report
on the trade and investment measures amongst the G20 countries.277 They
generated several reports detailing the types and impact of various trade and
investment measures. Aside from being tasked with a reporting function
that was already being undertaken in some respects by the WTO, the trade
272

Steve Johnson, Insurers Gear up for New Charges, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2011,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9b9bb046-2b10-11e0-a65f00144feab49a.html#axzz1Cum99eQO. Equities will need to be backed by reserves of 3040 per cent, while European sovereign debt is deemed risk free.” Id.
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Finnell, supra note 269.
274
Id.
275
DELOITTE, IAIS ANNUAL UPDATE: ANNUAL MEETING 2 (2010)
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/DcomUnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/FSI/US_FSI_IAISUpdate_120910.pdf.
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Factsheet,
The
G20
Mutual
Assessment
Process
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/g20map.htm (July 27,2010).
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Press Release, OECD, WTO and UNCTAD renew calls to G20 to resist
protectionism,
(Aug.
3,
2010)
(available
at
http://www.oecd.org/document/60/0,3343,en_2649_34529562_44741628_1_1_1_1,00.htm
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network has not been linked into the ongoing efforts of the G20. To be fair
the very preparation of these reports can be said to have restrained countries
enacting taking protectionist measures. But its participation has been
somewhat marginalized as the G20 progress reports and Leaders Summit
declarations reveal. While there is language calling for the conclusion of
the Doha Round and the need to resist protectionist tendencies, the WTO,
OECD and UNCTAD joint reports emit a sense of frustration that the G20
has not pushed for more on the trade front.
Given the highly
plenipotentiary nature of trade officials prone to the domestic politics, it
would be difficult to claim that the Trade Network exists in the G20 as an
independent network.
IV. EVALUATING THE G20’S COORDINATION
Having identified a model of new global governance in the G20
coordination of multiple TRNs, the next step would be to evaluate the
model. One might conceive two basic criteria for this purpose. First, does it
work? Critics often point to the tedious process of G20 operation, in
particular after the initial success in coordinating anti-crisis measures.278
Some critics simply question the empirical foundation of a “success.”279
Others consider such lack of satisfying progress as a “structural” dilemma
inherent in the nature of a network.280 Second, is it legitimate? We would
break this second question into sub-questions: is it accountable, equitable
and appropriately representative? The G20’s invisible nature raises
transparency and accountability questions. Also, now that most of network
operations are undeniably dominated by the Western developed countries,
poor countries’ concern for any possible alienation, marginalization and
even exploitation should not be readily dismissed.281 Finally, even though
278

See, e,g., Marina Larionova, Assessing G8 and G20 Effectiveness in Global
Governance So Far, 31 INT’L ORG. RES. J. 99 (2010) (noting that there is information
questioning G20 success as an ant-crisis management mechanism).
279
See Kenneth Anderson, Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and Global
Governance Through Global Government Networks, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1277-78
(2005) (reviewing ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004)).
280
See Verdier, supra note 7, at 166. See also Heather Stewart and Larry Elliott, Hopes
Fading for Salvation at the Summit, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 22, 2009,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/mar/22/g20-global-economy1 (noting that some
critics doubt if the diversity of the G20 can come to any agreement whatsoever).
281
Interestingly, these criteria themselves might conflict each other. For example,
scholars often attribute the initial success of G20 in tackling the financial crisis to the
smallness of its membership that facilitated an agile decision-making process, which in
turn could be translated into effectiveness. At the same time, however, a number of non-
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TRNs may claim legitimacy based on expertise, TRN insularity raises
concerns given their influence in a pluralistic world.
A. The Effectiveness of G20 Operation
Assessing the G20’s efficacy requires an assessment of the coordinated
network structure generally and also an inquiry into whether the G20 has in
particular accomplished what it has set out to do. Unsurprisingly, neither
inquiry will be free from debate. As Alexandroff and Kirton point out, the
experts disagree as to whether the G20 structure will be an effective one.
Some see it as a step backward away from rules based multilateralism, or as
an outright failure, while others see it as a strong start to creating a much
needed global governance regime.282 Looking more particularly at the tasks
that the G20 has set out for itself and its success in accomplishing those
tasks, the response has been varied as well.283
First, it is vital to recognize that the effectiveness of G20 operation
depends largely on that of the TRN itself as a regulatory engine. In this
regard, the verdict on the efficacy of the TRN among scholars is a mixed
one. Anne-Marie Slaughter argues a government network is the “real new
world order,”284 and “the blueprint for the international architecture of the
21st century.”285 Kal Raustiala even argues that government networks could
members, in particular developing countries, criticize its exclusive membership that keeps
those countries at the margin of global decision-making process.
282
See Alexandroff & Kirton, supra note 95, at 177–178.
283
IVAN SAVIC & NICK ROUDEV, G20 RES. GROUP, PROGRESS ON G20 FINANCIAL
REGULATORY COMMITMENTS FROM WASHINGTON 2008 UNTIL TORONTO 2010 (2010)
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/analysis/g20finregs.html.
284
SLAUGHTER, supra note 2, at 183, 197. Perhaps one should not bundle all networks
together in one category for the purpose of evaluation. Each network addresses a different
problem, although there might be some functional overlapping among these three kinds. Id.
Therefore, a different type of network should be subject to a different criterion for its
effectiveness. In this regards, Slaughter’s three categories of government networks,
depending on their major functions (goals) in networking may help. According to
Slaughter, there are three different types of network: “information networks” which not
only exchange regulatory views but also filter information on regulatory standards;
“enforcement networks” which facilitates individual and collective enforcement of network
norms; “harmonization networks” in which regulatory standards converge. Id. at 167–68.
In this sense, the G20 might be said to meet all these three criteria since it facilitates all the
regulatory dialogues among government officials (information network), creates regulatory
prototypes (harmonization network), and even commits itself to adopt and implement those
prototypes subject to peer review (enforcement network). Here, Slaughter uses the term
“networks” as referring to relatively loose, cooperative arrangements across borders
between and among like agencies that seek to respond to global issues. Id. at 14.
285
Id.
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complement treaties by facilitating their operation or smoothing their
negotiation or even supplement them by conducting certain gap-filling
functions.286 However, Kenneth Anderson points out, rightly, the difficulty
involved in evaluating its worthiness i.e., “whether these government
networks are actually solving problems or merely talking about
problems.”287
Skeptics challenge the eventual effectiveness, and thus the very
rationale, of a TRN. Their skepticism is two-fold: empirical and structural.
First, skeptics may contend that the G20 case study suffers a selection bias.
They may argue that its alleged success hinges mostly on its subject-matter
(“finance”), rather than on the network operation itself. In other words, they
contend that the network theory would not work well in more sensitive
areas such as arms control or nuclear non-proliferation.288 Likewise,
skeptics might point out the lack of empirical confirmations on the political
cross-bargain between certain regulatory subjects. In theory, one might
reasonably speculate that the U.S. might cede to the EU’s penchants for
stricter CRA regulation in exchange for the latter’s adoption of a modified
version of the Volker rule.289
Admittedly, the subject-matter of networking is critical for its
potential success. As seen in the government networks addressing the Y2K
problem, those issues around which networkers share strongly converging
interests are more readily prone to a coordinated response from networkers
than other issues.290 And while the G20 may claim success in addressing the
financial crisis,291 it has not been able to agree on the post-crisis measures,
in particular the global imbalances. These issues appear to be analogous to
those related to “vital national security interests” or those “touching on
issues of high domestic political sensitivity.”292 Therefore, the issuespecificity matters in determining the overall success of G20 operation,
though it might not be the sole factor.293
Perhaps a more difficult question might be how to define a success
or failure. This question is basically an “empirical” one. If one focuses
286

Raustiala, supra note 19, at 6.
ANDERSON, supra note 279, at 1276 (arguing that Slaughter fails to provide
persuasive “empirical” evidence as to whether a government network actually works).
288
VERDIER, supra note 7, at 123
289
We thank Pierre-Hugues Verdier for this point.
290
ANDERSON, supra note 279, at 1275–76.
291
G20 on Financial Crisis Response: It Worked, REUTERS, Sept. 25, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/09/25/columns-us-g20-communique-victoryidUSTRE58O59K20090925.
292
SLAUGHTER, supra note 2, at 208.
293
Anderson argues in this way. Anderson, supra note 279, at 1276.
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solely on end products from the G20 coordination, there might be a plenty
of proofs for its success, as long as an evaluator fully appreciates an
incremental nature of such norm-making process and thus inevitably soft
attributes of these prototypes. Yet if one ascribes its success to any real life
regulatory changes in people’s behaviors, not merely the existence of
newly-crafted multiple regulatory standards, we might have to wait for
some time before we render any definite judgment. Indeed, what might at
first seem a success, can be proven later to be a failure.294 Likewise, one
might argue that those new standards would have materialized any way
from national, not necessarily global, initiatives. In such case, the G20
would have played a rather modest role.
In contrast, some scholars pin their skepticism in the very structure
of TRNs. They question the power of the bond or socialization among
networkers. They basically view that networkers as government officials,
tend to serve and be controlled by their domestic constituencies, rather than
loyal to a “hypothetical global polity” such as a government network.295 In
this context, Kenneth Anderson observes that:
[Government officials] are primarily fiduciaries acting on behalf
of others whose values they represent, not seekers of reason or the
truth as such, and they are not free to ignore the constituents they
represent and to depart on their own searches for truth with their
fellow truth-seekers in an international forum.296
Skeptics also argue that without any formal bargains TRNs cannot
effectively handle distributive consequences, such as costs and benefits, of
adopting a certain standard which might negatively or positively affect each
state.297 Moreover, they argue that networks alone cannot secure
294

See Jeffery Atik, Basel II: A Post Mortem, 19 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
731, 748–59 (2011). For example, see criticisms of Basel II: Amy Scott, Banks Brace for
Basel
II,
MARKETPLACE:
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PUB.
MEDIA,
Jul.
2,
2008,
http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2008/07/02/basel_ii/; Avinash D. Persaud,
Point of View: Banking on the Right Path, 48 FIN. & DEV. Q. (2008),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2008/06/saurina.htm; Andrew Crockett, General
Manager of the BIS and Chairman of the Financial Stability Forum, Remarks at the 38th
SEACEN
Governors’
Conference
(Feb.
13,
2003)
(available
at
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp030213.htm) (addressing each of five criticisms generally
levied against Basel II); JÓN DANÍELSSON ET. AL., LSE FIN. MARKET GROUP, AN
ACADEMIC RESPONSE TO BASEL II, (2001) (arguing that Basel II proposals failed to address
a number of issues that could destabilize the global financial system).
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Verdier, supra note7, at 115.
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Anderson, supra note 279, at 1292–93.
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Verdier, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 115, 129.
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enforcement of those standards once they are adopted.298 Finally, skeptics
predict that networkers are forced to defect from previously established
standards if domestic lobbies pressure those networkers.299
Unlike the empirical critique, however, these structural attacks
against the effectiveness of government networks betray some “realist”
assumptions. They nearly equate global governance with the world
government. As long as we live in an anarchy, all treaties, even if they are
technically binding, are basically vague any way and unenforceable in the
domestic sense in many occasions. In other words, international cooperation
– formal and informal – may not bring forth any immediate compliance
which can be secured by direct remedies in the domestic sense. Also in our
view, the structural critique is over-consequentialist. Insofar as realists are
readily inclined to dismiss the effectiveness of government network based
on the lack of domestic enforcement mechanisms, they largely lose sight of
the value microscopic networking processes. We would argue that the
realist world is too simplistic: realists are blinded by their fidelity to
enforcement. Simply, there are more dynamics going on within the TRN
than realists conceive.
True, networkers as regulators are subject to various domestic
checks and pressures from not only their governments but also the media
and the public. Yet they are not “masterless ronin”300 or mere mechanical
tools of their government. They also “shape” their governments’ policies.
Most of them are not political appointees. On the contrary, many are career
officials who sit on the same issue area for decades. Even politicians cannot
ignore their judgments. Likewise, skeptics assume that the domestic power
dynamics on a given regulatory issue is always linear and domestic
constituencies’ preferences unitary. The reality is far more complicated.
There is simply more room for regulators, as norm-sponsors, to advocate
and internalize network standards which enjoy professional (expert)
legitimacy. 301
More importantly, the soft nature of standards recommends them
because they will be reviewed by national regulators prior to
implementation. As seen in the example of EU Directives, it is up to each
domestic jurisdiction how to implement the network standards, more
precisely how to “fine-tune” them in accordance with its domestic legal
system. In addition, a TRN can have a monitoring/surveillance mechanism,
as seen in the G20 Progress Report, thereby securing opportunities for self298

Id. at 115–16.
Id. at 129.
300
Anderson, supra note 279, at 1296.
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Indeed as discussed infra, this may be an independent criticism of TRNs.
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correction via feedback. Finally, the G20, as the Leaders’ Summit, itself
holds some ability to encourage compliance.
In sum, the empirical line of critique on TRNs has a point in that this
new model of global governance still needs to be further vetted.
Nonetheless, insofar as the G20 has succeeded to generate various
frameworks and regulatory prototypes, its operation could be called a
success.
While the ability of the G20 to generate prototypes can be used to
proclaim the G20 a success, before doing so we should critique whether
these are at least the prototypes called for by the circumstances. In other
words, did the G20 do what it had intended to do? The Washington Action
Plan speaks in broad terms of “effectively regulated financial markets”302
but it also sets some more specific tasks for itself including reinforcing
international cooperation, reforming international financial institutions and
even more specific goals such as exercising strong oversight over credit
rating agencies.303 We believe that the G20 set for itself a primary goal of
developing an architecture to coordinate the workings of the various TRNs
to combat the crisis and that it was successful in doing so.
The construction of the architecture had several key components.
Early on leaders worked out the structure and role of the Financial Stability
Forum transforming it into the FSB.304 During the Washington Summit
FSF Chair Mario Draghi and IMF Managing Director Strauss-Kahn
resolved their disagreement about the role and relationship of their
respective institutions to the new global financial architecture. The two
agreed that a lightly institutionalized FSF would set new standards, but the
organizationally powerful IMF would then monitor and enforce compliance
with them.”305 The resulting action plan reflected this agreement.306
The Leaders tapped the Finance Ministers to initiate an “action
plan” and “timeline.”307 That action plan called upon the resources and
efforts of the IMF, the FSF, the Finance Ministers, the BCBS, the World
Bank, the OECD, and the key global accounting standards bodies (IASB
and FASB, IASCF).308 The G20 “Progress Reports” on its actions plans
reveal a carefully choreographed response to the crisis.309 The Washington
302
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304
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Action Plan for example, asked the FSF to assist private sector bodies as
well as key global accounting standard setting bodies with strengthening
transparency and accountability; the FSF and IMF were asked to develop
“recommendations to mitigate pro-cyclicality”; the BCBS was asked to
study stress testing models; the OECD was asked to facilitate tax
information exchange among other things.310
Interestingly, in some ways the G20, acted somewhat like a meganetwork,311 conducting both a norm-making and a coordinative function. Its
coordination spurred regulatory prototypes, with swiftly implementable
guidelines and recommendations, as well as frameworks consisting of longterm action plans or policy directions to coordinate between and among
sector-specific regulatory prototypes. 312 In addition, the G20’s unique
surveillance (peer review) mechanism, such as the MAP,313 under which the
G20 can collectively evaluate each member’s record of compliance with
previous blueprints and regulatory prototypes, is yet another sign of
Trustee of the International Accounting Standard Committee Foundation (IASCF) have
agreed to establish a formal link to a newly created external Monitoring Board composed
of public authorities, including chairs of the expanded IOSCO Technical Committee and
the IOSCO Emerging Markets Committee. The success of this monitoring body will be
reviewed by summer 2010. Members also approved to expand the International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) membership to 16 members and provided guidelines
for geographic diversity”) Id. a 4. The progress reports are extremely detailed and focus
on each of the bodies tasked with any duty under the action plans.
310
WASHINGTON ACTION PLAN, supra note 179, at 1–5.
311
Such notion of “mega-network” or a horizontal “network of networks” is not new.
Slaughter locates such a network of networks in the Financial Stability Forum (FSF)
formed in 1996 by amalgamating three independent government networks – the Basel
Committee, the International Organization of Securities Commissioners (IOSCO), and the
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) – in order to addressing those
regulatory issues common to different types of financial institutions (banks, securities
companies and insurance companies), such as the capital adequacy ratio and other riskrelated rules. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 2, at 135.
312
Admittedly the leaders (prime ministers or presidents) are not professional
regulators themselves and probably do not know anything about how the international
finance is actually operating. But they offer critical political "glues" which hold those
individual networks together as well as some aura of legitimacy. As a corollary, the G20
will move on even if all the current leaders are replaced in the next elections as long as
those professional regulators still manage the micro-level regulatory networking. The
networks that it coordinates have existed for some time and have been strengthen by the
G20 Leaders coordination. Alexandroff and Kirton for example describe the actual
negotiations in the Washington Summit as “going well” stating that there was a
“substantial degree of personal involvement, passion and even spontaneous discussion
among the leaders.” Alexandroff & Kirton, supra note 95, at 183.
313
See Factsheet: The G-20 Mutual Assessment Process, International Monetary Fund,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/g20map.htm (last visited Jul 15, 2011).
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effectiveness in executive coordination. Importantly, the G20 Leaders
coordination resulted in part from their shared belief in the needed response
to the crisis. Undeniably though despite some shared beliefs the Leaders
group remains a political grouping subject to typical political pressures
from diverse constituencies.
B. Legitimacy Questions: Accountability, Equity, and Representation of the
G20 Operation
While the ineffectiveness critique of the TRN assumes the lack of
autonomy of network participants, the legitimacy critique takes a
diametrically opposite position on the nature of network participants. The
legitimacy critiques include concerns over accountability, equity, and
representation. While we think that the legitimacy critiques have merit we
believe that they can be ameliorated. In fact, we hope that our dissection of
the coordinated network phenomenon aids in that effort.
Some scholars fear that the disaggregation of a unitary state, which
forms a foundation of TRNs, would unduly weaken the state authority.314
They fear that those regulators would acculturate themselves too much with
the network norms or their ideals in a way which may go against the
traditional value of state sovereignty or national interest.315 Therefore, they
suspect that the government network would “tip[] in favor of global
governance in ways that devalue democracy and democratic
accountability”316 For example, there is a real question of whether G20
nations are going to hand over sovereignty to the G20 or any other
institution to institute changes that might be needed to ameliorate the
tension between globalization and financial risk.317
There are responses to these concerns. TRNs are still subject to
various domestic mechanisms of check and balance. While network
participants as norm-entrepreneurs internalize network standards by
creating new domestic legal and political dynamics, these standards are still
subject to domestic judicial/legislative challenges in a post-internalization
stage.318 One could even argue that TRNs may enhance accountability by
providing counterforce against domestic special interests which often
capture domestic regulators and undermine the public policy. Nonetheless,
314
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the government network’s soft, informal nature may still be a double-edged
sword. Although it may facilitate interstate cooperation, it may sidestep
various checks and disciplines secured by a formal mechanism, such as
administrative or constitutional law, or the concern of transparency and
democratic accountability.319
Ideally, national lawmakers should be
attuned to these concerns and not allow the TRN process to foreclose
national checks and balances.320
Another potential criticism against the government network is that
the whole network operation is biased in favor of the powerful developed
countries.321 The end products of the network, such as regulatory
prototypes, might already reflect those of the dominant states.322 Based on
his empirical study on various government networks, Kal Raustiala
observes that networks tend to impose powerful nations’ regulatory model
upon less powerful countries since the former dominate in the networking
process.323 Therefore, the North may be a standard-setter, while the South
may be a standard-taker.324
319

Verdier, supra note 7, at 115 (observing that TRN’s very advantages, such as
informality, tend to raise some problems which remain largely unattended by pre-existing
literatures). Id. at 169. See also Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational
Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490, 1530–34 (2006); Benedict
Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 15, 34–35, 37–39 (2005).
320
See discussion, Karmel & Kelly Section III.
321
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SUSTAINABILITY 36–38 (Thomas Fues & Peter Wolff eds., 2010): Sir Richard Jolly, Future
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response to it” under what she dubbed the “financial fetishism”).
323
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at 24–25.
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“The analysis here predicts that powerful jurisdictions will, as a result, compete as
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In this vein, Anne-Marie Slaughter, the chief advocate of TRN,
herself acknowledges that regulatory convergence toward network norms,
often pressured by the very dynamics of a network, might be seen as
illegitimate in a certain domestic political context.325 Stephen Toope even
argues that “[n]etworks...are sites of power, and potentially of exclusion and
inequality.”326 Likewise, networks might undermine a traditional space of
more formal public international law under which less powerful countries
might receive better protection via sovereign equality.327
While this power disparity critique holds water in general, particular
advantages may still exist under certain circumstances for less developed
members of the network when they adopt pre-made, pre-tested regulatory
standards of major advanced countries, in particular through a “strategic cooptation,” discussed above.328 First, such regulatory importation may reduce
regulatory costs in that importing jurisdictions need not create those
standards from scratch.329 Second, from the standpoint of less developed
members adopting the dominant member’s standards tends to accord the
former’s standards an aura of legitimacy, which in turn encourages more
members to adopt the dominant standards, such as those of the United
States.330 Third, as more members within the government network adopt a
certain (dominant) standard, the utility generated by adopting the standard
tends to increase. Economists label this phenomenon of self-proliferation of
dominant standards as the “network effect.”331 Moreover, at least as far as
the G20 is concerned, the new geography of power embodied in the G20
membership could mitigate the power disparity concerns to some extent.
Admittedly, questions still remain as to whether this is the right
representation, whether there are countries missing, and whether the
Northern countries have too much influence.332
International Affairs: The SEC Speaks in 2001, 1235 PLI/Corp 977 (2001), at 996.
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The use of coordinated networks also raises a host of other
legitimacy questions. Representativeness, or input legitimacy,333 seems
weak because as we know networkers are not elected, they tend to be civil
servants. The career regulator status of network participant means that
network legitimacy is based more on expertise, or output legitimacy,334 than
on representativeness. TRNs may be perceived as legitimate because they
produce good work.335 Of course, what constitutes good work assumes a
normative position, so even the expertise justification is not perfect.
Financial regulation impacts environmental efforts,336 labor,337 pensions,338
health care339 and even food security.340 Specialized career regulators are
poorly situated to consider the externalities imposed on other issue areas.
Bank regulators in the banking network come from a common background
and experience. Their ability to tolerate risk may be different from someone
who focuses on labor or healthcare or even trade. However we conceive
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40977_20091209.pdf. See also Stephen Fidler, WTO Chief
Blasts Top Economies Financial Oversight, WALL ST. J., May 17, 2010 (noting that Pascal
Lamy has question the G20 legitimacy and what incentives exists for non G20 nations to
follow the rules set by the G20); David Bosco, Who’s Afraid of the G20?, FOREIGN
POLICY,
Sep.
28,
2010,
http://bosco.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/09/28/does_the_g_20_need_a_secretariat
(reporting that some non-G20 members think that the G20 is a “fundamentally illegitimate,
self-selected body”).
333
Robert Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Between Centralization and Fragmentation: the
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(Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t Working Paper Series, No. 01–004, 2001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=262175 (discussing input legitimacy
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of legitimacy,341 we need to be able to evaluate to what extent
unrepresentative or expert institutions reach beyond their expertise to
account for the values of a pluralistic society.
One might claim that it is the coordination of the G20 that
legitimizes the goals of the TRNs. We would argue that such a claim would
need careful examination. One would have to consider to what extent the
G20 could (and did) take account of the interests and constituencies affected
by the TRNs. Our concern here is not that a political grouping such as the
G20 could never legitimize the work of the TRNs, simply that we should
not assume that it does. Nor should we allow the expert status of the TRNs
to supply the G20 with a veneer of legitimacy that may be undeserved.
In addition to the general concerns of representativeness there are
some specific representativeness concerns that stem from the work that
TRNs do. Networkers’ expertise, their insular dealings, and the matters at
stake, subject them to a unique danger of capture. Most agencies face
capture by special interests because those special interests have tremendous
incentives to focus their efforts on persuading the agency to adopt favorable
positions.342 More dispersed groups that may be affected by the agency
have less ability to coordinate.343 Capture at the TRN level is especially
problematic for several reasons. The networks collect an elite set of
regulators working, at times, far away in secluded settings. These
regulators are already known to industry and in some instances move
between government work and industry. These regulators are particularly
attractive to special interest groups because capturing just one of the
regulators may allow an interest group a veto over the entire process.344 But
what is particularly problematic is the influence of different states’ positions
on any particular proposal. Suppose that regulator from country A wants a
rule regulating hedge funds that is fairly strict and enforceable. Regulator
from Country B agrees that hedge funds should be regulated but prefers a
softer approach. Lobbyist C (working for the hedge fund industry) will not
only lobby State A to change its position but will also Lobby State B to
press hard on regulator from State A.
The fluid and incremental nature of network also calls for a new
conception of legitimacy. Networks operate over a period of time. Their
tasks change, sometimes at their own insistence. Our conception of
341

For a description of various legitimacy frameworks see, Kelly, supra note 334.
Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9,
Capture, and the Race-to-the-bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569, 584 (1998) (explaining
capture).
343
Id. (explaining capture).
344
Id. at 569.
342

PLEASE DO NOT DISTRIBUTE OR QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR

68

NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

[9-Aug-11

legitimacy must account for the fact that networks may sometimes act as
semi-autonomous norm generators working over time.345 The combination
of this incremental work combined with the fact that their end products
often harden into domestic law, leads to the possibility of a gloss of
unwarranted legitimacy.346 Further because their work spans decades, they
invest time, credibility, and capital that creates a certain amount of path
dependence. Once a national jurisdiction considers hardening a network
prototype or recommendation through regulation or legislation there has
already been considerable buy-in because of the amount of time and
expertise expanded at the network level. Thus, there is a real concern
whether the national checks and balances discussed above will be side
stepped. We would worry that the incremental process could undermine
national debate. Thus, our conception of legitimacy must account for the
incremental and semi-autonomous operations of networks. TRNs need to
manage their legitimacy, proactively, and seek input and processes that
justify their work over a period of time. States must ensure that their
national processes are not short circuited.
Networks insularity and technical focus also creates a challenge for
representative legitimacy. Networks hear from the same voices, in part
because in order to converse intelligently in their world one must speak the
technical language they speak.347 One might wish to complement networks’
expertise with input legitimacy in the form of additional process or indirect
representation. For example transparency can help. One might perceive
networks as more legitimate if their proceedings were viewed and
understood by more people. But transparency has costs as well.
Transparency can sometimes thwart negotiations.348 And one can never
assure transparency to all aspect of negotiations.349 Alternatively, opening
up the network process to members of civil society for example might
improve process, representation, and transparency, but it is less than a
perfect solution. More participation might mean more delays350 or even
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derailment of regulatory efforts.351 Allowing for more participation does
not mean it will be forthcoming. Both the BCBS and IOSCO have public
comment procedures but receive comments almost exclusively from
industry insiders. Finally, one should not assume that civil society is itself
accountable, or representative is all respects.352 The type of process or
procedure needs to be coordinated as well. Our conception of legitimacy
may need to be more contextual. 353
In sum, while the G20 coordination tends to raise a number of
accountability and legitimacy concerns, they are not insurmountable. Yet
the G20 should first acknowledge, not dismiss, the validity of those
concerns. Then, the G20 should find ways to address each concern focusing
its unique context. One solution might not serve all occasions. For example,
measures enhancing transparency, if implemented randomly, might in fact
unduly slow down the decision-making process at a professional level.
CONCLUSION
Coordinated TRNs herald a new model of global governance that is
flexible, spontaneous and effective. As seen in the G20 example, the
coordinated TRN model can deliver prompt regulatory responses to global
challenges of our time, such as the recent financial crisis. One might
reasonably speculate that a conventional international response via pure
diplomacy or treaty-making would not have achieved the same result. As
the G20 leaders themselves declared with confidence, it “worked.”354
Nonetheless, this nascent paradigm of global governance has
attracted various criticisms from different standpoints, such as efficacy and
legitimacy. As discussed above, some of these criticisms are not without
merits, while others may be exaggerated. Certainly we want to consider the
meritorious concerns.
First, governments, including the G20 members, should facilitate
more communications and better networking among like-minded
networkers (government officials) and between these networkers and
351
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international organizations which often offer forums for such networking.
For this purpose, governments should encourage personnel exchanges and
hold many policy discussion forums, such as workshops and seminars, so
that regulators in the same sector from different countries can brainstorm
and deliberate on areas of their common interest. As Kal Raustiala argues,
government networks could complement treaties by facilitating their
operation or smoothing their negotiation or even supplement them by
conducting certain gap-filling functions.355 In a related vein though
government should also consider issue areas that these networks affect
which are beyond their area of expertise and take steps to include voices
that speak to those issue areas. Civil society may be able to offer assistance
in this regard, however, government must be mindful of whether civil
society participants are themselves legitimate.
Second, developed countries should offer a genuine, not mere lipservice, level of development aid to developing countries to boost the
latter’s human capital. Without serious capacity-building, developing
countries cannot effectively participate in this networking process. Under
this situation, any network standard (regulatory prototype) would be hard to
survive the dominance critique.
Third, government networks should establish more active, rigorous
and consistent surveillance mechanisms to increase the overall efficacy of
their network standards. Without this policy evaluation/feedback process,
any initial blueprints or regulatory prototypes would soon cease to evolve.
Importantly, it is the characteristic nature of a government network that a
network standard should continuously evolve toward a more solid outcome.
Fourth, government should invest more in social marketing or PR
over the network phenomenon. For most people, the network phenomenon
remains esoteric. Insofar as people are ill-informed of this new model of
global governance, its prospect is not bright. Moreover, government
networks can anticipate any constructive criticisms from domestic
constituencies and civil society only when they are well-informed of the
network phenomenon.
Finally, the G20 as a mega-network or a network of networks
embraces unique challenges which may not be shared by other individual
networks. While a network symbolizes the “disaggregation” of state356 in
that each network is a sector (issue)-specific and de-centralized
phenomenon, the G20 “re-aggregates” those multiple networks and project
a mega-network, which inevitably restores a conventional inter-national
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representativeness. As long as the G20 holds this plenipotentiary nature, the
current size of membership will continue to be debated, probably without
any immediate consensus. Moreover, as the exigency of financial crisis
eventually ebbs away, the political capital bestowed on the G20 network
will also decline.357 Under this circumstance, the erstwhile strong
professional cohesion that bonds various individual networks together may
disappear. Then, the G20 may degrade into an empty talk shop.
To avoid this worst case scenario and preserve the G20 momentum,
some pundits, including the next G20 Summit host, the French President
Nicolas Sarkozy, propose that a permanent secretary be instituted for the
G20. Plausible as this proposal may sound in the first place, it also
generates new dilemmas for the G20. First, the G20, as a mega-network,
has in fact been successful due to soft institutionalization. Yet with this hard
institutionalization and consequent augmented bureaucratization, the G20
may lose its characteristic agility in policy response. Second, this new
mega-bureaucracy, which may only parallel the UN in its magnitude, may
invite a familiar foreboding of a World Government among sovereigntists.
Such foreboding may cost the G20 some reputation (legitimacy) regardless
of its merits.
In conclusion, it is fair to state that the hitherto success of
government network in general, as well as that of the G2o in particular, may
not offer a firm guarantee for their future prosperity. Although this new
model of global governance is salutary, the jury is still out there for a final
verdict on it. Meanwhile, however, the G20 has enough room to further
evolve into a better paradigm of global governance.
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